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Nelemans: Redefining Trade-Based Market Manipulation

REDEFINING TRADE-BASED MARKET
MANIPULATION
Matthijs Nelemans∗
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Subject, Reason, and Objective of the Article
Trade-based market manipulation (“manipulation”) is thought of as
trading shares specifically to cause a price change. The behavior may
best be explained by an example. Consider a trader willing to sell one
million shares of ABC stock to an institutional investor in a contractual,
person-to-person, deal. In the morning, the two parties enter into a
contractual agreement, stating that the closing price of the ABC shares
on the exchange will be taken as the transaction price. In the afternoon,
the trader buys 10,000 shares of ABC on the exchange for no other reason
than to inflate the price from $10 to $11, thus fixing the closing price
higher in his favor. Obviously, the trader benefits at the expense of the
institutional investor.
Many nations have regulations against manipulation: Section 10(b)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“SEA”), Rule 10b-5, and
Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA prohibit manipulation in the United States;
Section 1(2)(a) of the Market Abuse Directive (“MAD”) 2003/6/EC in the
European Union; and Section 1041A of the Corporations Act (“CA”) 2001
in Australia.1 The problem is that these regulations, which will be
discussed in Section I.A.1., are overly broad. The irony is that the
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Merritt Fox, Jeffrey Gordon, Katharina Pistor, Alan Palmiter, Ok-Rial Song, Mathias Siems,
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Ribbink, Alan Littler, Steve Kuchta, Garrett Law, David Ulrich, and seminar participants at
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1
The repression of trade-based market manipulation goes back more than a century.
One of the first cases in the United Kingdom occurred in 1892: Scott v. Brown, Doering,
McNab & Co., (1892) 2 Q.B. 724, 730 61 L.J. (N.S.) 738, 741 (C.A.). The first case in the
United States arose in 1933: United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). See
LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3986.10-20 (VIII Revised 2004); see
also Hubert De Vauplane & Odile Simart, The Concept of Securities Manipulation and Its
Foundations in France and the USA, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 203, 206-10 (1997).
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regulations, in conjunction with common enforcement actions,2 may ban
welfare-enhancing trades.
Unsurprisingly, the status quo has instigated an academic debate
about the just definition of manipulation.3 Fischel and Ross delivered an
analysis of existing definitions and suggested an improved definition.4
They concluded that “there is no objective definition of manipulation,”5
and so, “[t]he only definition that makes any sense is subjective—it
focuses entirely on the intent of the trader.”6 Yet, their argument for
shifting from an objective definition to a subjective one, which will be
examined in Section I.A.2, has both a practical and doctrinal flaw.
This Article aims to confront these problems by proposing an
improved definition of manipulation, which is not only useful to design
future policy, but also to interpret existing prohibitions. Further, since
defining behavior is the start of a natural research sequence, other points
of controversy can be more readily discussed, such as the tracing of
manipulation,7 the incidence of manipulation,8 and the justification for
2
There is a continuous stream of enforcement actions. See, e.g., Rajesh K. Aggarwal &
Guojon Wu, Stock Market Manipulations, 79 J. BUS. L. 1915, 1935, 1938 (2006). Their sample
includes 142 manipulation cases brought by the SEC between 1990 and 2001. About half
the cases included some form of trade-based market manipulation. Further, European and
Australian authorities were recently involved in two high profile cases. The German
regulator investigated Citigroup in 2005. See Päivi Munter, Criminal Investigation Sought in
Citigroup Bond Case, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 24, 2005. The Australian regulator came to a
settlement with a director of HIH Insurance, Ltd. See also David Elias, Adler Guilty on 4
Charges, THE AGE, Feb. 17, 2005.
3
See, e.g., Guido A. Ferrarini, The European Market Abuse Directive, 41 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 711 (2004); Omri Yadlin, Is Stock Manipulation Bad? Questioning the Conventional
Wisdom with the Evidence from the Israeli Experience, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 839, 842 (2001);
VIVIEN GOLDWASSER, STOCK MARKET MANIPULATION AND SHORT SELLING 99-138 (1999);
Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial
Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 507-10 (1991); Gary L. Gastineau & Robert A. Jarrow,
Large-Trader Impact and Market Regulation, 47 FIN. ANAL. J. 40, 41 (1991).
4
See Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 510 (“Manipulative trades could be defined as
profitable trades made with ‘bad’ intent—in other words, trades that meet the following
conditions: (I) the trading is intended to move prices in a certain direction; (2) the trader
has no belief that the prices would move in this direction but for the trade; and (3) the
resulting profit comes solely from the trader’s ability to move prices and not from his
possession of valuable information.”).
5
Id. at 512.
6
Id. at 510.
7
See, e.g., Marcello Minenna, The Detection of Market Abuse on Financial Markets: A
Quantitative Approach, at 32-33 (2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=483962 (2005); LARRY
HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES 273-74 (2003); Yadlin, supra note 3, at 849-50; IOSCO,
INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING MARKET MANIPULATION 12-21 (2000); GOLDWASSER,
supra note 3, at 113-19; Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—The Mechanics of Securities
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regulation.9 However, the improved definition does not resolve the
enforcement complexities, nor does it examine the incidence of
manipulation.
1.

Current Prohibitions and Their Shortcomings

In the United States, Section 10(b) of the SEA10 and Rule 10b-511 have
become the most important prohibitions to counteract manipulation.
The language of the Statute is at least as important as the language of the
Rule, since courts have interpreted the Statute more narrowly than the
Rule.12 According to the Statute, it is unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. . . any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance.” Section 10(b) of the SEA, like Rule
10b-5, is so broad that informed traders who execute large transactions
Manipulation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219, 291-94 (1994); Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 519-21;
Gastineau & Jarrow, supra note 3, at 44-45; J.I. GOLDSTEIN & T.A. LEVINE, SECOND ANNUAL
MARKET MANIPULATION 120-34 (1990).
8
See, e.g., Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, Unchecked Intermediaries: Price Manipulation in
an Emerging Stock Market, 78 J. FINAN. ECON. 203 (2005); Guolin Jiang, Paul G. Mahoney &
Jianping Mei, Market Manipulation: A Comprehensive Study of Stock Pools, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 147
(2005); Aggarwal & Wu, supra note 2; Yadlin, supra note 3; Paul G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools
and the Securities Exchange Act, 51 J. FINAN. ECON 343 (1999).
9
See, e.g., Thel, supra note 7, at 287-97; Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 553; Gastineau &
Jarrow, supra note 3, at 45.
10
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange. . . (b) To use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
11
Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
12
ALAN PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION 268-69 (2002).
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might be qualified as manipulators even though they discount new
information into the stock price. It is common knowledge that informed
traders are necessary to keep financial markets efficient.13 As a result, by
erring on the side of caution, they may forego welfare-enhancing trades.
Another statute against manipulation is Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA,14
which has become obsolete due to the high burden of proof and its
inapplicability to the over-the-counter market.15 This provision applies
to “a series of transactions in any security. . . raising or depressing the
price of such security.” Remarkably, it encompasses all transactions
raising or depressing the price, thus including transactions that discount
new information in the price and secure efficient prices. I recognize that
the applicability of the provision is limited by a mens rea element: “for
the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.”
Nevertheless, it is inaccurate to compensate an overly broad actus reus
with a mens rea element. This would still mean that traders are not
allowed to trade and discount new information in the price, if it is for the
purpose of inducing other traders to follow suit.16
In the European Union, twenty-five Member States have
implemented a new prohibition on manipulation in the last few years:
Section 1(2)(a) MAD 2003/6/EC. In short, this provision requires that
market participants refrain from trading when their transactions would

See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 7, at 235-43.
Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange, or for any member of a
national securities exchange . . . (2) To effect, alone or with one or
more other persons, a series of transactions in any security registered
on a national securities exchange or in connection with any securitybased swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act) with respect to such security creating actual or
apparent active trading in such security, or raising or depressing the
price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale
of such security by others.
15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (2000).
15
See ALAN R. BROMBERG AND LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND
COMMODITIES FRAUD § 6:67, 195-97 (2d ed. 2003).
16
Public companies frequently buy large amounts of shares, inducing the market to
purchase shares and to bring the stock price to the fundamental value. See, e.g., Jesse Fried,
Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 42634 (2000). Due to the overly broad actus reus, Section 9(a)(2) SEA 1934 could in fact restrict
public companies to use buy-back programs for signaling purposes.
13
14
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secure the price at an abnormal level.17 Although the law does not define
“abnormal level,” the prohibition might cover the situation in which a
trader increases the price from $10 to $11, provided that the price had
previously been stable at $10 for a sufficient period of time. However,
the European prohibition ignores the fact that this trader could have
impounded new information in the price. Therefore, it may criminalize
welfare-enhancing trades and deter legitimate traders.
Furthermore, the Australian prohibition in Section 1041A CA 2001 is
limited to transactions that create an artificial price.18 Admittedly,
artificial price is more precise than abnormal price, but the concept still
leaves the potential for multiple interpretations. The financial markets
regulator (“regulator”) could use the prohibition on manipulation to
counteract various transactions, i.e. all transactions raising or depressing
the price, uninformed transactions raising or depressing the price,
transactions having the purpose of raising or depressing the price, or
transactions moving the price away from the fundamental value. Evidently,
the regulator has discretionary powers to apply the prohibition as long
as the term artificial price or the behavior that results in an artificial price
is not defined precisely.
What can be concluded from all of these prohibitions? It seems that
neither Section 10(b), nor Rule 10b-5, nor Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA
precisely delineates manipulation. Even though courts have interpreted
and qualified the type of behavior that counts as manipulation,
significant ambiguity in defining the term “manipulation” still exists.19
Section 1(2)(a) MAD 2003 provides:
Market manipulation shall mean transactions or orders to trade which
give, or are likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply
of, demand for or price of financial instruments, or which secure, by a
person, or persons acting in collaboration, the price of one or several
financial instruments at an abnormal or artificial level.
Market Abuse Directive, Section 1(2)(a) 2003/6/EC.
18
Section 1041A CA 2001 provides:
A person must not take part in, or carry out . . . : (a) a transaction that
has or is likely to have; or (b) 2 or more transactions that have or are
likely to have; the effect of: (c) creating an artificial price for trading in
financial products on a financial market operated in this jurisdiction;
or (d) maintaining at a level that is artificial (whether or not it was
previously artificial) a price for trading in financial products on a
financial market operated in this jurisdiction.
Corporations Act, § 1041A 2001 (Australia).
19
See, e.g., A.A. SOMMER JR., FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §§ 6.01-6.06
(2004) (providing an overview of the caselaw); BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 15, at
§§ 6:56-6:75; GOLDSTEIN & LEVINE, supra note 7, at 3-99.
17
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Moreover, the European and Australian prohibitions may be
overinclusive due to the vague delineation of manipulation. The
European and Australian courts have not produced any case law that
sets a precedent to protect informed traders. The problem, therefore, is
that these prohibitions most likely cover legitimate welfare-enhancing
trades.
a.

An Academic Definition and its Shortcomings

The definition of manipulation has been widely debated, and legal
scholars have suggested several definitions attempting to cover the
various facets of manipulation. Fischel and Ross wrote a provocative
article in the early 1990s discussing the need for regulating
manipulation, to which Thel levied a serious reply.20 Fischel and Ross
analyzed existing definitions and suggested an improved one.21 They
concluded that “there is no objective definition of manipulation,”22 and
so, “[t]he only definition that makes any sense is subjective—it focuses
entirely on the intent of the trader.”23 Thel did not question the
definition suggested by Fischel and Ross, but merely focused on the
arguments regarding regulating manipulation.24 Yet, the shift from an
objective to a subjective definition is both practically and doctrinally
flawed.
What is the practical flaw? In situations of manipulation, bad
intentions can have both practical and beneficial effects. Envision an
informed trader who intends to manipulate the price. This trader does not
cause any damage, despite his bad intentions. On the contrary, his
trading is actually beneficial to the market as a whole, discounting new
information in the price. Evidently, this type of trader should be
excluded from the prohibition, but this is only possible if a clear objective
See Fischel & Ross, supra note 3; Thel, supra note 7.
See Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 510 (“Manipulative trades could be defined as
profitable trades made with ‘bad’ intent - in other words, trades that meet the following
conditions: (1) the trading is intended to move prices in a certain direction; (2) the trader
has no belief that the prices would move in this direction but for the trade; and (3) the
resulting profit comes solely from the trader’s ability to move prices and not from his
possession of valuable information.”).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Thel, too, derives the normative judgment from the intent of the trader. Thel, supra
note 7, at 221 n.17 (“When used in this Article, unless the context otherwise requires, the
word ‘manipulation’ means buying a security for the purpose of increasing the reported
price or selling a security for the purpose of decreasing the reported price.”) (emphasis
added).
20
21
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definition of manipulation exists. For this reason, focusing entirely on the
trader’s bad intent does not make sense. Moreover, traders with good
intent sometimes execute detrimental transactions. An uninformed trader
who has no intentions of manipulating the price may exercise large price
pressure and cause extensive damage. One should be able to qualify this
behavior as manipulation, e.g. in civil cases. Yet, according to Fischel
and Ross’s suggested definition, this behavior could not amount to
manipulation, since there was no intent, notwithstanding the significant
damages.
There is also a doctrinal flaw. When it comes down to defining
prohibited behavior, legal scholars commonly agree that a prohibition
should merely cover objective undesirable behavior. Indeed, no one is
punishable for their thoughts—cogitationis poenam nemo patitur. This
means one cannot automatically shift from an objective to a subjective
prohibition. Fischel and Ross clearly endorse this viewpoint by
acknowledging that “the law typically requires an objectively harmful
act before sanctions are levied[]” and that “[b]ad intent by itself is not
sufficient.”25 Nevertheless, they prefer to derive the definition of
manipulation from the trader’s subjective intentions. They argue that
because prohibitions generally require clearly observable objective harm,
while manipulation does not produce easily-observable, objective harm,
the term “manipulation” should be defined subjectively. Fischel and
Ross’s reasoning, however, does not withstand careful scrutiny.
If Fischel and Ross believe that prohibitions in general should merely
cover behavior resulting in clearly observable objective harm, and that
manipulation usually does not produce such harm, they should not have
designed a new definition of manipulation. Remarkably, they suggested
an improved definition of manipulation that focused on the trader’s
intent. In addition, because Fischel and Ross considered observability of
the objective harm to be essential, their suggested definition would be
expected to emphasize the observability in some way. They concluded,
however, that the prohibition should preferably not rest on the
unobservable objective harm, but instead on the unobservable intent of
the trader. This is an exchange of one unobservable element for another.
Clearly, they have not succeeded in designing a prohibition on
manipulation that incorporates the observability of the trader’s behavior.

25

See Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 519.
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Furthermore, Fischel and Ross’s assumption that prohibitions should
only cover behavior producing clearly observable objective harm is
relative. I agree that most prohibitions cover behavior that results in
observable objective harm. Indeed, by prohibiting only this kind of
behavior, authorities would face fewer enforcement complexities,
limiting the probability of Type I errors. At the same time, however,
prohibitions covering unobservable harm could contribute to shaping
and changing norms and preferences,26 which may offset the costs of
false convictions. Moreover, authorities regularly enforce many other
complex prohibitions, such as prohibitions on tax evasion and insider
trading,27 or establish proof of the unobservable mens rea, such as
“knowledge” or “willful.” Proof of manipulation and its objective harm
could largely depend on circumstantial evidence, just like proof of tax
evasion, insider trading, or mens rea does.28
B. The Structure of the Article
A few questionable prohibitions and definitions of manipulation
have been proposed by various legal scholars. Given the shortcomings
of these suggested definitions, the main purpose of this Article is to
construct an alternative objective definition of manipulation, which takes
into consideration the societal costs of trading. The blueprint of a
definition rests upon the behavior and consequences of manipulation.
The first element, the actus reus, is straightforward. A manipulator, like
any other trader, executes one or more transactions. Therefore, the
consequences of the transactions are the distinguishing factor, in
particular, the societal costs. As will be shown, the core of manipulation
can best be described as exercising unsupported price pressure because this
creates societal costs.29

26
See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill and Chaim Fershtman, Law and Preferences, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
331, 331-32 (2004); Ted Sampsell-Jones, Culture and Contempt: The Limitations of Expressive
Criminal Law, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 133-34 (2003); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and
Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586 (1998); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis
of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 39 DUKE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1990).
27
See, e.g., Linda S. Eads, From Capone to Boesky: Tax Evasion, Insider Trading, and Problems
of Proof, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1421, 1421, n.1 (1991).
28
Id. at 1454, 1466.
29
I merely consider how transactions create societal costs and ignore the potential costs
of enforcing such a prohibition on manipulation. Nevertheless, one of the outcomes of the
analysis is the introduction of a materiality standard, regulating the application of the
prohibition and incorporating the costs of enforcement. At the extreme end, the materiality
standard could in fact obstruct the use of the prohibition.
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The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Section II is
descriptive. Section II.A.1 introduces a novel concept called price
pressure, which extends the commonly used concept of price change.
Section II.A.2 examines how one can exercise price pressure, and how
price pressure explains price changes and shows that prohibitions could
advantageously bypass the term price changes. Section III develops an
alternative standard for evaluating different forms of price pressure.
Here the concern is normative. Supported and unsupported price
pressures are differentiated from one another. As a result, a prohibition
could be based on the unsupported price pressure-standard, allowing
supported price pressure but barring unsupported price pressure.
Section IV of this Article considers certain policy of existing
prohibitions on manipulation. The current prohibitions are not always
compatible with the unsupported price pressure-standard and may be
tailored to the requirements of the standard.
Furthermore, the
prohibitions may be limited with a materiality standard, thereby taking
into account the enforcement costs with regard to immaterial,
unsupported price pressure. Subsequently, the analysis sheds light on
the longstanding debate concerning the possibility of designing an
objective definition of manipulation and the specific role of the mens rea
element. Finally, Section V examines the application and extension of
the unsupported price pressure-standard.
II. THE DESCRIPTIVE SIDE OF PRICE PRESSURE
A. How to Define Price Pressure?
Manipulation has both a descriptive and a normative side. This
Section analyzes manipulation from a descriptive perspective. It
explains what price pressure is, how it relates to price changes, and how
the extent of the price pressure is determined. According to economic
theory, transactions have at least two effects. Transactions sometimes
directly influence prices, causing prices to change or stabilize.30
Additionally, transactions always spread market information, which

30
See, e.g., Robert W. Holthausen & Robert W. Leftwich, The Effect of Large Block
Transactions on Security Prices. A Cross-Sectional Analysis, J. FIN. ECON. 237 (1987); Myron S.
Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the Effects of
Information on Share Prices, 45 J. BUS. L. 179 (1972); Alan Kraus & Hans R. Stoll, Price Impacts
of Block Trading on the New York Stock Exchange, 27 J. FIN. 569 (1972). Still, most transactions
(95.9%) do not result in a price change or result in a small price change of 1/8 percent. See
Thel, supra note 7, at 224.
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traders use for their investment decisions.31 Market information
sometimes indirectly influences prices. Section II discusses the role that
these transactions have regarding direct price influence. Section V.B.1
extends the analysis to transactions that spread market information and
indirectly influence prices.
1.

The Definition of Price Pressure

A preliminary issue is how the execution of transactions results in a
price change. Accordingly, the efficient market hypothesis provides a
ready-to-use description.32 Corporations first disclose new information,
traders then execute transactions, and the price finally adapts to the new
information.
Since disclosed information drives transactions,
information will be discounted in the price. New information, however,
is not a necessary condition for price changes. Financial markets are, to a
large extent, but not completely, efficient. As a result, they leave room
for traders who engage in large transactions to dry up or wash over
liquidity, forcing the price up or down for some limited time. In such
situations, no information is discounted in the price. While it stands to
reason that most traders have insufficient capital to cause price changes,
large traders in liquid markets and small traders in illiquid markets will
sometimes be able to inflate or deflate the price.
To study manipulation, one should look at the individual
contributions to the total price change, not at the collective effort to
change prices. This is an underexposed aspect explored in previous
articles and in cases involving manipulation.
Quite often, the
manipulator is simply held accountable for the total price change, even
though such reasoning is not always justifiable. Envision a market with
one manipulator and two normal traders. Each person buys stock in
corporation ABC within a short interval, while the price of ABC shares
rises from $10 to $15 synchronously. The manipulator might be
completely responsible for this price change, even though his
31
Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 AMER. ECON. REV. 393, 393 (1980) (arguing that “the price system makes
publicly available the information obtained by informed individuals to the uninformed.”).
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549 (1984) (explaining how derivatively informed traders extract information from other
traders).
32
See, e.g., Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON.
PERSPECT. 59 (2003); Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J.
ECON. PERSPECT. 83 (2003); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS. AN INTRODUCTION TO
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000).
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contribution might be negligible. So, the challenge is to determine if, and
to what extent, the manipulator and his subset of transactions has
contributed to the price rise, and to what extent the other traders are
responsible.
In order to enable this appraisal, we can move away from the
conventional definitions of manipulation, which normally concentrate on
the execution of transactions and price changes. This Article takes a
different approach and focuses on the vital link between transactions
and prices—the price pressure. A trader first executes transactions, then
exercises price pressure, and lastly influences the price. Price pressure is
defined as the contribution to the total price change. I prefer the term
price pressure instead of contribution to the total price change, thereby
making a clear distinction between the various forces that add up to the
price change and the actual price change itself. Price pressure is the
independent or explanatory variable, while price change is the
dependent variable. According to this approach, the accumulation of all
individual price pressure equals the price change.
2.

Price Pressure and the Price

Most traders exercise no, or negligible, price pressure. The category
of traders exercising relevant price pressure is small. To illustrate the
idea of price pressure, consider the following model of a market with
three traders (X, Y, and Z). Each trader exercises relevant price pressure
(X’, Y’, and Z’) within a certain interval. The regulator suspects X of
manipulation by exercising X’ and investigates how the three traders
and their price pressure explain the price change, so that he will have a
reliable estimate of the extent of X’. The regulator first determines the
pre-manipulation price at t. He then estimates the values X’, Y’, and Z’
between t and t+i in order to explain the stock price at t+i. The premanipulation price at t and the post-manipulation price at t+i can be any
positive number. The values X’, Y’, and Z’ are positive for upward price
pressure, negative for downward price pressure, and zero for no price
pressure. The relationship between the three types of price pressure and
the total price change is depicted in the following equation:
i

i

i

h =1

h =1

h=2

Stockpricet +i − Stockpricet = X '+Y '+ Z ' = ∑ xt + h + ∑ yt + h + ∑ z t + h
In order to assess whether X is indeed a manipulator, the regulator
should first determine X’ by using the step-by-step plan described in
Section II.B, and then make a normative judgment about X’ on the basis
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of the standard developed in Section III. There are two approaches for
estimating X’. The first option is to assess X’ directly by deriving X’
from the price change. The second is to estimate X’ by subtracting all
other forms of price pressure from the price change. Assume that X’, Y’,
and Z’ are in fact +$5, -$3 and +$1, respectively, while the total price
change is +$3.
The regulator will probably assess X’ directly.
Nevertheless, he could also calculate X’ by subtracting Y’ and Z’ from
the price change: (+$3) - (-$3) - (+$1) or (+$5). The direct way is
preferable as it is less convoluted and entails fewer arithmetic steps.
Nevertheless, the indirect way might serve as an additional check,
especially when Y’ and Z’ are easy to discover.
The suspect will often contribute in some way to the price change.
Sometimes, while he is not completely responsible for the price change,
the suspected trader might have: (1) reinforced, (2) stabilized, or (3)
created a price change. The trader reinforces a price change when he
brings about a price change that is larger than it would be without X’,
stabilizes a price change when the price change is weaker than it would
be without X’, and creates a price change when he is fully responsible for
the complete price change. For that reason, when a regulator suspects X
of manipulating the price, because, for example, the regulator observes
no price change or a large price change when he expects otherwise, he
cannot decide the direction or the extent of X’ just by looking at the stock
price behavior.33 If a regulator focuses on the stock price behavior
instead of the price pressure, disregarding the subtle difference, chances
are he will under- or over-estimate the extent of X’.
B. How to Determine Price Pressure?
The preceding analysis suggests that the regulator should determine
the extent of the suspect’s price pressure. In making the determination,
the regulator should use the following sequence: first, approximate the
extent by linking the suspect’s trading volume to the total price change;
33
Consider the following two situations. In the first situation, a regulator believes that a
manipulator has operated, and he observes no price change, where he expects otherwise.
What is the size of X’? X’ could have been either downward or upward and either small or
large. X’ could have been -$0.1. That is when the combination of Y’ and Z’ turns out to be
+$0.1. But X’ could just as well have been -$5, provided that the other forces add up to +$5.
In the second situation, a regulator believes that a manipulator has operated, and he
observes a price change of +$5, where he expects otherwise. What is the size of X’? X’
could have been either downward or upward and either small or large. X’ could have been
+$0.1. That is when the combination of Y’ and Z’ turns out to be +$4.9. However, X’ could
just as well have been +$5, provided that Y’ and Z’ add up to $0.
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second, polish the approximation by discounting the characteristics of
the suspect’s transactions.
1.

Approximating the Suspect’s Price Pressure

There is a simple formula to approximate the suspect’s price
pressure: (‘the suspect’s trading volume’ / ‘the total trading volume’) * (‘Stock
pricet+1’ – ‘Stock pricet’). Consider the following two examples on how to
apply the formula.34
In the first situation, the suspect has bought 10,000 shares of ABC
within the defined interval and the rest of the market has bought 5,000
shares of ABC. So, both the suspect and the rest of the market exercised
upward price pressure. Suppose that the stock price has increased from
$10 to $12 within the defined interval. We are now able to estimate the
suspect’s price pressure, which by and large is (10,000 / (10,000 + 5,000))
* ($12 - $10) or +$1.33. At the same time, the other market participants
have exercised a price pressure as large as (5,000 / (10,000 + 5,000)) * ($12
- $10) or +$0.66. The price pressure of the suspect and the price pressure
of the rest of the market add up to the price change of +$2.
In the second situation, the suspect has bought 10,000 shares of ABC
within the defined interval and the rest of the market has sold 5,000
shares of ABC. In this situation, the price pressure of the suspect and the
rest of the market is in the opposite direction. The suspect exercised
upward price pressure and the rest of the market exercised downward
price pressure. Again, the stock price has increased from $10 to $12. The
suspect’s price pressure is (10,000 / (10,000 - 5,000)) * ($12 - $10) or +$4.
The other market participants have exercised a price pressure of (-5,000 /
(10,000 – 5,000)) * ($12 -$10) or -$2. So, the suspect’s price pressure and
the other price pressure add up to the price change of +$2.
2.

Polishing the Approximation

Now that the regulator has an approximation of the suspect’s price
pressure, he should polish the estimate. The articles of Fischel & Ross
34
In case the price pressure of the suspect and the price pressure of the rest of the
market are identical and contrary, so that the price completely stabilizes, the methodology
changes. Imagine that the suspect’s and the market’s price pressure are +$5 and -$5,
respectively.
It is impossible to calculate the suspect’s price pressure (+$5/0).
Alternatively, the regulator should estimate what the price change would have been
without the stabilizing transactions. Because this situation is exceptional, it exceeds the scope
of this Article and, therefore, it is not addressed herein.
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and Thel make clear how a manipulator is able to build up price
pressure.35 Transactions of significant volumes move the downward
sloping demand curve,36 act on the liquidity of the market,37 and/or act
on the bid-ask spread,38 thereby building up price pressure. As a general
rule, the larger the number, the size, and/or the density of the
transactions, the larger the price pressure. The regulator could use this
insight to polish the approximation: if the suspect’s transactions were
relatively more aggressive, that is if they were relatively more successful
in moving the downward sloping demand curve, in acting on the
liquidity of the market, and/or in acting on the bid-ask spread than the
transactions of the rest of the market, the approximation of the suspect’s
price pressure is on the low side and might be increased.

35
See Thel, supra note 7, at 227-47; Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 513-19. These authors
discussed how traders could use various mechanisms to cause price changes, like moving
the downward sloping demand curve, acting on the liquidity of the market, and acting on
the bid-ask spread. Traders will use the same mechanisms in order to cause price pressure.
The bid-ask bounce could be denoted as price pressure or price change, depending on the
interval and the other forces in the market. For convenience sake, I will treat it as price
pressure. The first two mechanisms result in an adjustment of the bid- and ask-price
(external price pressure), while acting on the bid-ask spread causes price pressure between
the bid- and ask-price (internal price pressure). However, all three mechanisms are useful
for building up real pressure.
36
When the demand curve is downward sloping, a demand or supply shift would result
in upward or downward pressure. In theory, each participant can exercise pressure
through this mechanism. There is empirical evidence for a downward sloping demand
curve. Howbeit, this particular mechanism will probably not be very effective for
manipulation because the decline is fairly small. See, e.g., Avner Kalay, Orly Sade & Avi
Wohl, Measuring Stock Illiquidity: An Investigation of the Demand and Supply Schedules at the
TASE, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 461 (2004); Jeffrey Wurgler & Ekaterina V. Zhuravskaya, Does
Arbitrage Flatten Demand Curves for Stocks?, 75 J. BUS. 583 (2002); Aditya Kaul, Vikas
Mehrotra & Randall Morck, Demand Curves for Stocks Do Slope Down: New Evidence from an
Index Weights Adjustment, 55 J. FIN. 893 (2000).
37
In case a market buy order is nearly as large as, or larger than, the accumulation of the
pending sell orders (to be sold at the current market price), the market buy order dries the
supply at the current market price and causes upward pressure. The mirror image is a
market sell order nearly as large as or larger than the accumulation of the pending buy
orders (to be bought at the current market price). The market sell order floods the demand
at the current market price and causes downward pressure. Each market participant could
use this mechanism to exercise pressure. The success depends on two variables: (1) the
size, volume, and speed of the orders; and (2) the liquidity of the market.
38
A trader is able to cause an uptick or a downtick and change the market price. Let us
assume that the bid price is $10 and the sell price is $11. If the market price is $10 and the
following trade is a purchase, the market price will bounce to $11 (uptick). In case the
market price is $11 and the next trade is a sale, the market price will bounce back to $10
(downtick). The pressure between the bid and asks price is limited to the size of the bidask spread ($1).
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THE NORMATIVE SIDE OF PRICE PRESSURE

A. The “Unsupported Price Pressure” Standard
Section II dealt with the relationship between transactions, price
pressure, and price changes. Trading behavior still needs a normative
delineation. The following analysis concentrates on the normative side
of price pressure, showing that manipulation can be defined as
“exercising unsupported price pressure.”
1.

Unsupported Price Pressure

Government decision makers frequently fail to provide a clear and
immediate cause to regulate manipulation. According to one often used
reason, they would have to control the deliberate interference with the
free play of supply and demand in the security markets.39 Another
reason for counteracting manipulation is the prevention of a loss of
confidence in market operations.40 It could also be that manipulators are
active and other market participants lose confidence. Both claims,
however, lack serious empirical proof. Apart from that, even when
government decision makers have compelling reasons to prohibit
manipulation, they often design broad and general prohibitions, lacking
a clear normative distinction between legal and illegal behavior. Some
definitions rest primarily on poorly defined effects of trading in order to
delimit illegal behavior.41 Other definitions use intent to mark off the
H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) (“The idea of a free and open public market is built
upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to a fair price of the
security brings about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just
price.”); Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insider
Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), COM (2001) 281 def., 3 (“Fair prices
result from individual analysis by investors of all public information. Prices resulting from
manipulation are set at another level, creating economic advantage solely for the
manipulators, but damaging the interests of all other investors.”).
40
H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 10 (1934) (“To insure to the multitude of investors the
maintenance of fair and honest markets, manipulative practices of all kinds on national
exchanges are banned.”); Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), COM (2001) 281 def., 2
(“Market abuse not only increases the cost for companies to finance themselves but also
harms the integrity of financial markets and public confidence in securities and derivatives
trading.”).
41
See, e.g., Sec. Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b); Sec. Exchange Act of 1934, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003; Section 1041A CA 2001. See supra notes 10,
11, 14 and 18 (providing the full text of the provisions). The US provisions apply to “any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance’ and ‘any act . . . which operates . . . as a
fraud or deceit upon any person.” The European definition covers trades creating an
39
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supposed harmful behavior.42 In this way, the regulator exercises large
discretionary powers to regulate the market, which may deter market
participants from executing trades that would otherwise enhance
welfare. These prohibitions are not completely inadequate, but there is
an opportunity to narrow the prohibitions, communicating clearly to the
market what kind of behavior is illegal.
Few forms of trading result in societal costs. These trades qualify as
manipulative. Trades not resulting in societal costs are exempted. But,
when might trading bring about societal costs? One of the differences
between a manipulator and a “normal” trader is the quality of the price
pressure. Just as information differs in quality, price pressure can be of
high or low quality.43 I will use the term “unsupported price pressure”
for low-quality price pressure. A trader exercises unsupported price
pressure when he lacks sufficient information to justify the price
pressure. Logically, I will use the term “supported price pressure” for
high-quality price pressure. Traders exercise supported price pressure
when they have sufficient information to justify their price pressure.
Unsupported price pressure might create societal costs, because the price
impact is partially or completely unfounded.
Conversely, it is
reasonable to assume that supported price pressure does not result in
societal costs, because this trading contributes to the efficiency of prices.
Therefore, manipulation presupposes unsupported price pressure, which
is a necessary condition.
If a regulator investigates a suspect, he needs at least compelling
evidence that the suspect possessed insufficient information. The
support of the price pressure should be derived from two variables: (1)
the extent of the price pressure and (2) the extent of the justifiable price
pressure. If the trader’s price pressure is larger than the justifiable price
pressure, he produces unsupported price pressure. The trader’s price
pressure minus the justified price pressure equals the extent of the
unsupported price pressure. Otherwise, if the trader’s price pressure is
artificial or abnormal price, while the Australian definition is limited to trades resulting in an
artificial price.
42
See, e.g., § 9(a)(2) of the Sec. Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (2000). This
Section applies to trading, whether or not resulting in a price change, if it is for the purpose
of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others; see also the definition proposed
by Fischel and Ross, requiring bad intent.
43
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). Akerlof’s seminal paper on the market for lemons
shows that the production of low-quality information might result in societal costs. In the
same way low-quality price pressure can be costly and be a reason for regulation.
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equal to, or less than, the justifiable price pressure, he produces
supported price pressure.
Imagine a trader who executes transactions and causes price
pressure as large as +$5. He exercises: (1) unsupported price pressure
when his underlying information justifies, e.g. a price pressure of $0; (2)
partly supported price pressure (+$3) and partly unsupported price
pressure (+$2) when his underlying information justifies a price pressure
of +$3; or (3) supported price pressure when his information justifies a
price pressure of +$5 or +$8. A trader, who exercises price pressure as
large as the justified price pressure, loses his complete information
privilege; while a trader, who exercises price pressure smaller than the
justified price pressure, protects at least a part of his information. The
foregoing is depicted in the following three equations:
(1) trader’s price pressure
unsupported price pressure

>

justifiable price pressure Æ

(2) trader’s price pressure
supported price pressure

=

justifiable price pressure Æ

(3) trader’s price pressure
supported price pressure

<

justifiable price pressure Æ

The proposed approach to distinguish between manipulators and
“normal” traders relates to the empirical approach to make this
distinction. The empirical analysis of manipulation by measuring
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (“CAR”) is based on the following
reasoning. If supposed manipulators have inflated the price and the
price remains high over time, the traders were most likely informed and
not manipulative. Conversely, if the price drops, the traders were most
likely manipulators. The proposed standard concentrates on the
manipulator exercising unsupported price pressure, while the CAR
standard centers on arbitrageurs removing a created mispricing.
Obviously, the legal definition of manipulation should be based on the
proposed standard and not on the CAR standard, simply because the
legal definition ought to focus on the suspect’s behavior, whereas the
empirical approach covers the arbitrageur’s behavior. The following
example illustrates the difference between the “unsupported price
pressure” standard and the CAR standard.
Envision an informed trader who has information that points to
future price pressure of +$3 and exercises direct supported price pressure
of +$3 at t. Fifty traders observe this behavior and follow suit. Each
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trader exercises indirect unsupported price pressure of +$0.04 at t+1. In
this situation arbitrageurs do not reverse the +$3 contribution of the
informed trader. On the other hand, they will remove the +$2
contribution of the other traders. Even though the informed trader
exercised supported price pressure, the analysis shows some CAR due to
removal of the overreaction. Under the proposed standard, the informed
trader is no manipulator. Conversely, according to the CAR standard,
the informed trader may qualify as a manipulator. It is important to note
that a trader who exercises supported price pressure is not responsible
for causing indirect unsupported price pressure. Furthermore, the
individuals are not blamed, as each exercised irrelevant unsupported
price pressure.
2.

Factual Assessment

The procedure to determine whether a suspect has exercised
unsupported price pressure includes the following steps. The regulator
approximates the suspect’s price pressure based on the trading volumes,
and polishes the estimate by taking into account the characteristics of the
suspected transactions. The regulator then evaluates the suspect’s
information position at the moment of trading. Having translated this
information position into the justifiable price pressure, he can decide
whether the suspect has exercised unsupported price pressure or not. In
principle, the discovery of the information position requires hard
evidence. Also, the conversion of the information position to the
justified price pressure asks for an adequate and consistent
argumentation. However, how can a regulator apply the “unsupported
price pressure” standard in practice? The next paragraphs define the
concepts of “information” and “non-information.” They further describe
the method to discover the suspect’s information position and the way to
translate the information position into the extent of the justified price
pressure.
The application of the “unsupported price pressure” standard
depends in large part on the delineation of the concept “information.”
Henceforth, “information” is all information that points to: (1) an
undervaluation or overvaluation of certain shares; or (2) a change of the
fundamental value of certain shares. If shares of ABC are trading at $18,
and the trader has information that their fundamental value is $20, the
shares are undervalued and the trader is allowed to exercise price
pressure between $0 and +$2. On the other hand, a trader could have
information that points to a change of the fundamental value of certain
shares. For example, a trader is the first to know that company ABC will
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lose its successful CEO, probably decreasing the fundamental value of
the shares with -$1. In this situation, the trader is allowed to exercise
price pressure between $0 and -$1.44 It is important to note that the
trader can legitimately move the price away from the fundamental value
as long as he exercises supported price pressure. The trader could
legitimately sell shares and move the price from $18 to $17, even when
the fundamental value of the shares is $20, because he discounts new
information in the stock price.
Another important aspect of the “unsupported price pressure”
standard is the distinction between “information” and “noninformation.” Consider the following three situations. First, traders
sometimes believe they have information that is not yet discounted in
the stock price, while in fact it has been discounted in the stock price.
Second, traders sometimes receive information, which is discounted in
the stock price shortly after. In both situations, the trader has no
information and is not allowed to exercise price pressure. Third, two
traders could receive identical information at t, after which they both
exercise price pressure at t+1. If the traders receive information pointing
at future supported price pressure of +$2, their combined price pressure
should be +$2 or less. The more the information ages, the smaller the
justified price pressure. So, traders should keep in mind whether their
information by any chance ages and becomes non-information,
influencing the extent of justified price pressure.
How does the regulator then discover the information position? In
theory, the regulator should determine what kind of information
circulated within the complete market, in all states of the world, and what
information has reached the suspect. Obviously, the regulator is hardly
able to assess the suspect’s information position at the moment of
trading.45 Certainly, he is faced with a formidable task. Hence, he will
have to gather a lot of soft evidence about the probability of an
insufficient information position, most likely deriving an estimate of the
44
This trader could of course violate the prohibition on insider trading. Nevertheless, a
trader discounting inside information into the stock price contributes to efficiency and
cannot be qualified as a manipulator.
45
See Yadlin, supra note 3, at 849 (“Thus, very rarely will a fact-finder be able to
determine whether or not a particular scheme was based on information.”). Indeed, we
know from the enforcement of insider trading laws that the suspect’s information position
is hard to prove. The regulator should determine what kind of information circulated
within the company and what information might have reached the insider. He could, for
example, use minutes from corporate meetings, reconstructing the information position of
the insider.
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supposed information position from the characteristics of the trades and
the interests of the trader, an approach that includes a high risk of Type I
errors. There are situations in which a regulator is not able to determine
the suspect’s information position, although he is able to conclude that
the suspect’s information position was most likely insufficient to justify
the exercised price pressure. For example, this occurs where a market
participant causes an exceptional price increase of at least ten percent or
where a market participant shows extraordinary behavior that goes with
a significant expected profit.
In case the regulator is able to derive the suspect’s information
position, the next step is the conversion of the suspect’s information
position into the justified price pressure. A regulator has to provide a
well-argued estimate of justified price pressure, in the absence of a
definite algorithm to calculate this value. A weak information position
justifies small price pressure, just as a strong information position
justifies a large price pressure. If an uninformed trader merely wants to
gamble, having no relevant information, the extent of the justified price
pressure is $0. If, however, an insider knows that the price is going to
rise, the justified price pressure is relatively large. People may find the
analysis of the information position and the conversion of the
information position problematic. As already stated, the regulator is
often not able to determine the precise extent of the unsupported price
pressure, although he has opportunities to legitimately conclude that a
trader most likely has exercised unsupported price pressure.
3.

Some Improvements

This Article is based on the dichotomy of supported and
unsupported price pressure. The difference lies in the quality of the
price pressure. Most other papers distinguish between informed traders
and uninformed traders who cause a price change. One should not
confuse both approaches. First, the proposed standard clearly isolates
price pressure from noticeable price change. In this way, the focus is on
the contribution of the suspect and not on the outcome of the market.
Second, the standard is applicable to assess both uninformed traders,
who exercise price pressure, and informed traders, who exercise more
price pressure than justified price pressure. Finally, the standard allows
us to determine the extent of the unsupported price pressure, because it
distinguishes between exercised and justified price pressure.
Consequently, it is possible to introduce a materiality standard. Let us
now examine the differences between the “unsupported price pressure”
standard and a few other standards put forward in the past.
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Yadlin46 and Easterbrook47 point out that manipulation relates to the
trader’s information position. Accordingly, a trader, who produces a
price change while he has no information, might be a manipulator. Even
though this approach has its merit, it is not explicit. The authors ignore
the difference between price change and price pressure, making it hard
to determine the extent of the price pressure. Moreover, they focus on
uninformed traders who influence the price, ignoring informed traders
who exercise unsupported price pressure. Their approach is sufficient
when a trader was partially or completely responsible for a price change,
while being uninformed at the moment of trading. However, the
approach is insufficient when the same trader was in possession of an
information set. In that case, one should first determine the extent of the
exercised and justified price pressure before being able to judge the
quality of the price pressure. In addition, when a trader has exercised
unsupported price pressure, both the exercised and the justified price
pressure are necessary to determine the extent of the unsupported price
pressure.
The papers of Gastineau & Jarrow48 and Fischel & Ross49 linked
manipulation with uninformed profits. Again, this approach has merit,
although one should develop the idea so that it may be implemented.
For this purpose, the standard of unsupported price pressure is relevant.
The following example illustrates why the extent of the exercised and
justified price pressure are essential to estimate the uninformed profit.
Consider a trader who possesses some information, knowing that the
price of ABC shares will rise from $20 to $23. Next assume that this
trader buys 1,000 shares of ABC and causes a price rise from $20 to $25
per share. Since the trader’s justified price pressure is +$3 and the
trader’s exercised price pressure is +$5, the supported price pressure is
Id. at 842 (“I distinguish between informed and uninformed manipulators. Both types
of manipulators trade for the purpose of affecting the market price. But informed
manipulators are privy to information that leads them to believe that the market has
mispriced the stock and that their effect on the market will better reflect the stock’s
value.”).
47
Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures Markets, J.
BUS. L. 103, 118 (1986) (“The essential distinction is between secret strategies necessary to
capture the value of new information about underlying conditions and secrecy designed to
cause prices to diverge from those that reflect the underlying conditions.”).
48
Gastineau & Jarrow, supra note 3, at 41 (“[I]n the absence of information that suggests a
trading strategy will yield a positive, risk-adjusted return . . . , the trader undertakes it
anyway, expecting to profit from advantages related to size and intertemporal differences
in market impact.”).
49
Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 510 (“[T]he resulting profit comes solely from the
trader’s ability to move prices and not from his possession of valuable information.”).
46
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+$3 and the unsupported price pressure is +$2. This is sufficient to
determine both the extent of the informed and uninformed profit.
Assume that the trader exercises the aforementioned price pressure right
after he has signed a contract with another party to sell 100,000 shares of
ABC in a person-to-person deal, while the implicit and explicit costs of
exercising the price pressure are negligible. Under these circumstances,
he would have been able to reap an informed profit of $300,000 and an
uninformed profit of $200,000, both on the contractual sale.
B. The Costs of Unsupported Price Pressure
The preceding Section illustrates why manipulation should be
defined as “exercising unsupported price pressure.” This Section
explores the dynamics of unsupported price pressure. Unsupported
price pressure causes welfare shifts between uninformed traders on the
one hand, and corrective traders or manipulators on the other. These
welfare shifts might drive away uninformed traders from the financial
markets, resulting in reduced liquidity and societal costs. The following
analysis explains that a prohibition of manipulation, which is in line with
the “unsupported price pressure” standard, could discourage
unsupported price pressure and, as such, increase social welfare.
1.

The Framework

A model is used to analyze effects of idealized market transactions.
The model includes four archetypical traders: (1) a manipulator; (2) a
corrective trader; (3) an informed trader; and (4) an uninformed trader. I
will give a short description of each of the traders and the quality of their
price pressure.
In a standard manipulation scheme, the manipulator exercises
upward unsupported price pressure to raise the price, thereby creating an
informational privilege. The manipulator’s exclusive knowledge that the
price is too high gives him an advantage over the other market
participants. The manipulator then sells a large amount of shares at the
inflated price, using his informational privilege. He will try to avoid or
limit the exercise of downward supported price pressure, since he would
otherwise discount information in the price and lose his informational
privilege. A successful avoidance results in a profit.
Corrective traders compete with a manipulator from the moment he
has exercised upward unsupported price pressure. Their only goal is to
discover manipulators and sell shares at the inflated price, thereby trying
to minimize the exercise of downward supported price pressure and
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maximize their profit. Informed traders are the first to receive new
information about the future of the company or market, and will trade
shares before other traders will be in the position to do so. They,
however, do not react to manipulators and manipulative schemes.
Informed traders endeavor to minimize the supported price pressure and
maximize their profit.
Uninformed traders do not have any information about the future of
the company or market, but still trade on a regular basis for various
reasons, for example, the investment of capital or the transfer of risk.50
The uninformed traders limit the size of their transactions and do not
create any relevant price pressure. They will sometimes trade with other
uninformed traders and sometimes with the manipulator, corrective
traders, or informed traders. The uninformed traders, on average, play
even when they trade with each other. Otherwise, they will lose.
The formalization is as follows. The pre- and post-manipulation
price at t and t+i can be any positive number. The model distinguishes
between a manipulator exercising upward unsupported price pressure
(M) and downward supported price pressure (O). A manipulator first
exercises M, raising the price before he unloads his shares at the inflated
price, and possibly exercises O. Furthermore, corrective traders exercise
downward supported price pressure (C), informed traders exercise either
downward or upward price pressure (I), and uninformed traders
exercise no or negligible price pressure (U). M, O, C, I, and U are either
positive for upward price pressure, negative for downward price
pressure, or zero for no price pressure. The relation is depicted in the
following equation:
i

i

i

i

i

h =1

h =2

h =2

h =1

h =1

Stockpricet +i − Stockpricet = M + O + C + I + U = ∑ mt +h + ∑ ot + h + ∑ ct + h + ∑ it + h + ∑ ut + h

M, I, and U start at t+1, while O and C will not start before t+2. As a
rule, if M is positive, O and C are negative, and vice versa. It is
important to note that mt+1 is always larger than or equal to ot+2 and ct+2,
while mt+1 can be smaller than ot+3 and ct+3. The sum of mt+1, mt+2, ot+2, and
ct+2 determines the maximum of ot+3 and ct+3. The larger mt+1 and mt+2 and
the smaller ot+2 and ct+2, the larger ot+3 and ct+3. This relation is depicted
in the following equation:

50

See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 7, at 176-200.
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∑ mt + h + ∑ ot + h + ∑ c t + h ≥ oi + c i
2.

The Analysis

The main question is to what extent a manipulator, defined as a
trader who exercises unsupported price pressure, creates societal costs.
The goal is to examine the most relevant potential costs, not to cover all
conceivable costs. A manipulator executes either one-sided trades or
two-sided trades. In the case of one-sided trades, he only buys shares
and exercises upward unsupported price pressure. So, the manipulator
exercises M, but not O. In case of two-sided trades, the manipulator first
buys shares, exercising upward unsupported price pressure, and then
sells shares to take advantage of the unsupported price pressure. The
manipulator exercises M and possibly O. Both one-sided and two-sided
trades cause welfare shifts between uninformed traders and corrective
traders. In the case of two-sided trades, the manipulator further sells
shares at the inflated price and benefits at the expense of uninformed
traders, provided that he minimizes O. All these welfare shifts might
drive away uninformed traders from the financial markets, resulting in
reduced liquidity and societal costs. The relation between unsupported
price pressure and societal costs will be discussed in more detail in the
following paragraphs.
a.

One-sided Trades and Welfare Shifts

Few manipulators buy shares and exercise upward unsupported
price pressure without selling shares to take advantage of the
unsupported price pressure. It is costly to create unsupported price
pressure and, therefore, taking a profit, by unloading a large number of
shares at the inflated price, is the rational outcome. Nevertheless, there
will always be some manipulators who miss their trading opportunity.
One can think of several scenarios in which this occurs. First, a
manipulator who has exercised unsupported price pressure, and initially
is in the position to make a profit by unloading a large amount of shares,
may pull back because the opportunity disappears quickly or the scheme
appears to be too risky or too transparent. Second, a trader who
exercises unsupported price pressure may be unaware that he actually
did so and consequently will not think of unloading shares at the
inflated price. Such an ignorant trader might qualify as a manipulator,
especially when his ignorance is reprehensible and the extent of the
unsupported price pressure is large. Notwithstanding the cause of one-
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sided trades, the trader produces: (1) extra volatility and (2) extra
information asymmetries. We will discuss both of these effects.
i.

Extra Volatility

Adding volatility to the market has its own welfare effects. A
manipulator will either increase or decrease the risk of a single stock. If
unsupported price pressure results in extra volatility, it increases the
risk. Conversely, if unsupported price pressure mitigates the price
variance, it decreases the risk.51 There are three relevant situations.
First, the manipulator exercises upward M, while there is no other price
pressure, thereby causing volatility by definition. Second, upward M is
in line with the accumulation of C and I. For example, M is +$2, while C is
+$3 and I is -$1. In this situation, the manipulator increases volatility.
Third, upward M is contrary to the accumulation of C and I. For
example, M is +$2, while C is -$3 and I is -$1. The manipulator mitigates
the volatility; however, he does this temporarily. The manipulator will
shortly afterward exercise O or induce corrective traders to exercise C,
increasing volatility. Therefore, the conclusion is that on average a
manipulator raises volatility.
ii. Costs of extra volatility
What happens after a manipulator has exercised M? Traders who
buy at an inflated price transfer wealth to investors who sell at an
inflated price. This is not automatically a problem. A manipulator will
not create costs to risk neutral traders if they are as likely to lose from
buying at a deflated price as they are to gain from selling at an inflated
price. Further, the manipulator will not thwart risk-averse traders,
provided that they have a well-diversified stock portfolio. According to
modern portfolio theory, investors with a well-diversified portfolio are
able to exclude unsystematic risk, which is risk associated with
individual assets. Nevertheless, a manipulator creates costs to riskaverse traders with a poorly diversified portfolio.
Hence, the
manipulator causes extra volatility and drives away this group of traders
from the financial markets. The reduction in liquidity could result in
societal costs.52

51
Cf. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41
DUKE L.J. 977, 1026 (1992).
52
Unsupported price pressure might have an influence on the size of the bid-ask spread,
because liquidity providers discount the stock price volatility and the extra risk. See Hans
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iii. Extra information asymmetries
A manipulator does not create only extra volatility, but also extra
information asymmetries. Indeed, a manipulator inflates the stock price
and consequently creates information asymmetries between himself and
the uninformed market segment. The idea that a manipulator establishes
an informational advantage is straightforward. Consider a manipulator
who exercises upward M of +$5 while there are no other forms of price
pressure, thereby slowly inflating the price from $10 to $15. The
manipulator has created an informational advantage: he knows that his
own activities are the source of the price rise, while the uninformed
market segment lacks this information. Even though the manipulator
endeavors to protect his information privilege as long as possible, he
cannot prevent that some corrective traders in the end will receive a
comparable informational privilege, especially when he is not able to
fully camouflage his identity.
iv. Costs of extra information asymmetries
What happens after a manipulator has exercised M? As the
manipulator buys shares at a price above the fundamental value to
exercise unsupported price pressure, he attracts relatively more
corrective traders than uninformed traders.
Thus, comparatively
speaking, a manipulator buys more shares from corrective traders than
from uninformed traders, benefiting the corrective traders more than the
uninformed traders.
If the manipulator, after having exercised
unsupported price pressure, does not unload a large amount of shares,
corrective traders replace the manipulator, selling shares to the
uninformed traders at the inflated price until the price returns to the
original level. The conclusion is that a manipulator creates extra
information asymmetries and benefits corrective traders vis-à-vis
uninformed traders. As a result, they drive away uninformed traders
from the financial markets. The reduced liquidity may again result in
societal costs.53

R. Stoll, Market Microstructure, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE: VOL. 1A,
CORPORATE FINANCE 562-63 (George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris & Rene M. Stulz
eds., 2003).
53
Informational asymmetries are an explanation for the size of the bid-ask spread. Id. at
563. Because information asymmetries increase the bid-ask spread, some traders might
leave the market and reduce the liquidity.
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Two-sided Trades and Welfare Shifts

Most manipulators execute both buy and sell transactions to make a
profit. The question is to what extent two-sided trades create societal
costs. The analysis is limited to a manipulator who first purchases
shares to inflate the price and then sells shares to profit from the inflated
price. This will either lead to symmetric or asymmetric price pressure.
Envision a manipulator who purchases 1,000 shares and inflates the price
from $10 to $15, while there are no other forms of price pressure. When
he sells 1,000 shares and the price returns to $10, it is a case of symmetric
price pressure. On the other hand, if he sells more than 1,000 shares
before the price returns to $10, it is a situation of asymmetric price
pressure. The analysis ignores manipulators who create symmetric price
pressure, as they will not make any profit and do not produce any other
costs than already discussed. Let us distinguish between a manipulator
who exercises asymmetric price pressure: (1) in the same financial
market and (2) in different financial markets. We will discuss how
traders can make a profit and if this results in societal costs.
i.

Two-sided trades in the same market

The manipulator first buys shares, creating large upward
unsupported price pressure, and then sells shares, creating little
downward supported price pressure. Imagine the following example. A
manipulator buys 5,000 shares and exercises upward M of +$1,
whereupon he sells 10,000 shares and exercises downward O of -$1.
Obviously, the upward price pressure exceeds the downward price
pressure. For expositional clarity, we assume that the manipulator pays
on average, an extra 0.55M per share and receives an extra -0.45O per
share, that is, he pays an extra $0.55 per share and receives an extra $0.45
per share.54 The manipulator will face a payout of (-$0.55 * 5,000) +
($0.45 * 10,000) or $1750. If the manipulator competes with corrective
traders, his payout will be (-$0.55 * 5,000) + ((1-x) * $0.55 * 10,000), where
(1-x) is a measure of the power to capitalize M.

54
This assumption is based on the following example. The price and the fundamental
value of a share is $5. A trader, for example, buys 500 shares at $5.1, 500 shares at $5.2, 500
shares at $5.3, and so on until the price reaches $6. He will then sell 1,000 shares at $5.9,
1,000 shares at $5.8, 1,000 shares at $5.7 and so on until the price reaches $5. Cf. HARRIS,
supra note 7, at 270-73.
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ii. The likelihood of societal costs
In theory, a manipulator is able to make a profit at the expense of
uninformed traders. This could drive away uninformed traders from the
financial markets, reducing market liquidity and creating societal costs.
It remains to be seen whether manipulators in practice are able to make a
profit. According to the cogent analysis of Fischel and Ross, making a
profit may be unlikely. In practice, M is usually counterbalanced by O.55
Even though Thel largely endorses the principle that profitable
manipulation is difficult, he rightly points out the importance of under
and overreactions.56 Nevertheless, as long as empirical research has not
produced profound insights in the causes and circumstances of these
mixed reactions, it is hard to draw any conclusions about market reforms
or regulation. The idea that manipulators cannot systematically reap
profits through contrary trades in the same market is supported by
recent empirical studies on the information content of suspected trades.
These studies show that many so-called manipulative transactions were
probably informed trades.57 However, there is also evidence that pump
and dump schemes might occur and be profitable.58 Considering the
mixed evidence, it is best to conclude that there is not enough proof of
manipulative profits and, therefore, societal costs.
iii. Two-sided trades in different markets
The Article started with an example of a trader who combines
trading on the exchange, and deal making outside the exchange. If the
manipulator buys 5,000 shares of ABC on the exchange and exercises M
of +$1, while contractual rights allow him to sell one million shares off
the exchange at the inflated price, he is able to make a profit. This is true
as long the trader minimizes the costs of exercising M and keeps O at a
minimum. Again, we assume that the manipulator pays on average an
extra 0.55M per share. However, since he sells shares in a person-toperson deal, he does not cause any O during the sale. Under these
circumstances and assumptions, the manipulator makes a profit of ($0.55 * 5,000) + ($1 * 1 million) or $997,250. The trader has to consider
Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 517-19.
Thel, supra note 7, at 261-67.
57
Jiang, Mahoney & Mei, supra note 8, at 147; see also Mahoney, supra note 8, at 343
(finding no evidence that stock pools were engaged in unsupported manipulation).
58
See, e.g., Asim I. Khwaja & Atif Mian, Unchecked Intermediaries: Price Manipulation in an
Emerging Stock Market, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 203 (2005); see also Aggerwal & Wu, supra note 2, at
1916.
55
56
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the influence of corrective traders. If the manipulator inflates the price of
ABC shares and corrective traders deflate the price before the
manipulator is able to capitalize M, his payout will be (-$0.55 * 5,000) +
((1-x) * $1 * 1 million), where (1-x) is a measure of the power to capitalize
M. In a similar way, the trader could combine trading on different
exchanges. He might trade ABC shares close to the expiration date of
ABC options to influence the price of the latter and, therefore, make a
profit.
iv. The likelihood of societal costs
It is reasonable to believe that manipulators in practice are able to
make a profit by trading in different markets: buying in a market where
prices are dynamic and selling in a market where prices are static. As
the manipulator makes a profit, the uninformed market incurs a loss.
Consequently, the manipulator might drive away uninformed traders
and reduce liquidity, creating some societal costs.59 Fischel and Ross, as
well as Thel and Yadlin, have described several real-life situations and
case law in which manipulators may have benefited.60 The authors agree
that manipulation is occasionally profitable. According to Fischel and
Ross, contract-based manipulation is “not clearly self-deterring because
the gains from triggering the contractual right could outweigh the losses
incurred by the alleged manipulator at the time of sale.”61 Thel
concludes that “contracts in which rights are contingent upon reported
security prices create tempting opportunities for manipulation.”62
Likewise, Yadlin believes “there are circumstances in which
manipulation is profitable.”63 Overseeing the real-life situations and case
law, it is plausible that manipulators sometimes make a profit and
therefore cause societal costs.
The objective of the foregoing discussion was to show that a trader
who exercises unsupported price pressure may create societal costs, even
when he does not profit from trading.
Thus a prohibition on

59
Since I aim to define manipulation and not to discuss the justification of regulation, I
will ignore the fact that they disagree about the necessary policy implications. Fischel and
Ross argue that the societal costs of regulation are high, making the solution worse than the
problem. Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 553. Thel believes that regulation will have a
necessary deterrent effect. See Thel, supra note 7, at 296-98.
60
Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 527-34; see also Thel, supra note 7, at 247-61.
61
Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 523.
62
Thel, supra note 7, at 261.
63
Yadlin, supra note 3, at 841.
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manipulation may discourage unsupported price pressure, and as such
increase social welfare.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. The Definition of Manipulation
Having introduced an improved definition of manipulation,
“exercising unsupported price pressure,” the focus is on some
contemporary thoughts about prohibitions on manipulation. The first
policy implication is the design of future prohibitions on manipulation.
The second policy implication is accentuating current prohibitions on
manipulation by using the “unsupported price pressure” standard.
1.

Future Prohibitions

At some stage, legislators in countries without a prohibition on
manipulation in place or in countries with an intention to change
existing prohibitions may want to explore the various options to design
or change their existing statutes. I do not claim that countries should
expand their legal systems with a prohibition, but if they prefer to do so,
they should design policy in line with the “unsupported price pressure”
standard. The most elementary prohibition bans traders who execute
transactions that result in unsupported price pressure. The legislator
then has to decide if and how it wants to restrict the application of the
prohibition. It could opt for: (1) a restricted prohibition, indemnifying
traders who exercise unsupported price pressure and do not expect to
benefit (as discussed below); (2) a materiality standard, excluding minor
forms of unsupported price pressure (Section IV.B); and/or (3) a mens rea
element, excluding traders who can be declared innocent (Section IV.C).
A legislator has to choose between a broad and a restricted
prohibition. The broad prohibition includes all traders who exercise
unsupported price pressure. The core of the prohibition would be as
follows: it is prohibited to execute transactions that result in unsupported price
pressure. The restricted prohibition excludes traders who exercise
unsupported price pressure and do not expect to benefit. The core of the
prohibition would provide: it is prohibited to execute transactions that result
in unsupported price pressure and go together with an expected unsupported
profit. The advantage of the broad prohibition is that it applies to traders
who exercise large unsupported price pressure and create significant
societal costs, even if they are not in the position to make a profit (Section
III.B.2.a). Because of this advantage, it is reasonable to believe that
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legislators will opt for a broad prohibition. The remainder of this Article
is based on this assumption.
2.

Contemporary Prohibitions

The next question is how legislators can accentuate Section 10(b) of
the SEA, Rule 10b-5, Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA, Section 1(2)(a) DMA
2003, and Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003. Section 10(b) of the SEA and Rule
10b-5 applies to “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance”
and “any act . . . which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any
person.”64 Both provisions could be more focused in the context of
manipulation. If the regulator interprets the provisions in line with the
“unsupported price pressure” standard, he would clearly communicate
to the market that traders are allowed to influence the stock price as long
as they discount new information in the price and exercise supported
price pressure. So, a trader would only violate Section 10(b) of the SEA
or Rule 10b-5 if he at least exercises unsupported price pressure.
Besides, the regulator could take into account the extent of the
unsupported price pressure and the culpability. Consequently, traders
do not have to err on the side of caution and are encouraged to enter into
welfare-enhancing transactions.
Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA refers to transactions raising or depressing
the price of a security.65 A first shortcoming of the prohibition is that it
applies to both transactions resulting in unsupported price pressure and
supported price pressure. If a trader executes transactions, exercises
supported price pressure, and causes the price to change, he technically
violates the prohibition. Even though the prohibition is pretty broad at
face value, it should be interpreted narrowly.66 For example, the court in
Trane Co. v. O’Connor Securities concluded that a risk arbitrageur was
allowed to cause a price change, because O’Connor “was convinced that
Trane was a ready target for unusual corporate activity in the form of a

64
See supra notes 10, 11 for a more complete text of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
respectively.
65
See Thel, supra note 7, at 221 n.17 (referring to “buying a security for the purpose of
increasing the reported price or selling a security for the purpose of decreasing the
reported price”).
66
H.R. REP. NO. 792, at 20 (1934) (“Of course, any extensive purchases or sales are bound
to cause changes in the market price of the security. If a person is merely trying to acquire
a large block . . . or desires to dispose of a big holding, his knowledge that in doing so he
will affect the market price does not make his action unlawful”); cf. S. REP. NO. 792, at 17
(1934).
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merger, take over or tender offer.”67 Even though the application of
Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA is limited through case law, this has not
established a crystal clear distinction between supported and
unsupported price pressure. One recommendation would be to restrict
the application of the prohibition to traders who exercise unsupported
price pressure.
A second shortcoming of Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA is that it only
applies to traders who create or reinforce a price change and not to traders
who stabilize the price or mitigate price changes. Consider a trader
exercising upward unsupported price pressure of +$1, while the rest of
the market exercises downward price pressure of -$1 respectively -$2.
The trader does not raise or depress the price, but stabilizes the price and
respectively mitigates the price change. If Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA is
replaced with the “unsupported price pressure” standard, it would
clearly cover transactions that raise or depress the price and transactions
that stabilize the price or mitigate price changes. Section 9(a)(2) of the
SEA could also be interpreted in line with the proposed standard, so that
the provision is applicable to all traders who exercise unsupported price
pressure, irrespective of the price influence. Anyhow, I prefer a
replacement, as an extensive interpretation would be rather forced.
Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003 applies to traders who execute transactions
and bring the price to an abnormal level. The prohibition does not
define “abnormal level” and there is no relevant secondary legislation.
Besides, because the European prohibition is new, there is no relevant
case law. At first glance, the prohibition applies to traders increasing the
price from $10 to $11, provided that the price had previously been stable
at $10 for a sufficient period of time. Nevertheless, an adequate
prohibition allows traders who execute supported price pressure and
bans traders who exercise unsupported price pressure. If Section 1(2)(a)
DMA 2003 is interpreted in line with the “unsupported price pressure”
standard, it would only be applicable to traders exercising unsupported
price pressure. From an economic perspective, it is reasonable to say
that a trader who exercises supported price pressure causes a normal
stock price, while a trader who exercises unsupported price pressure
causes an abnormal stock price.
There is another question to be answered. Let us assume that the
regulator interprets Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003 in line with the
67
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“unsupported price pressure” standard.
Then the prohibition is
definitely applicable to traders exercising unsupported price pressure
and creating or reinforcing a price change. But it remains unclear
whether the prohibition applies to traders exercising unsupported price
pressure, thereby stabilizing the price or mitigating a price change. One
could argue that a trader who stabilizes a price or mitigates a price
change does not create an abnormal price. As already stated, the
prohibition does not define “abnormal level” and there is no relevant
secondary legislation. This leaves room for an extensive interpretation.
It is advisable to interpret the prohibition in such way that it applies to
traders exercising unsupported price pressure and thereby affecting stock
prices.68 By doing so, the regulator is able to take action in all situations,
no matter whether traders create, reinforce, stabilize, or mitigate a price
change.
Furthermore, legislators every so often design prohibitions to
counteract traders who cause artificial prices.69 Section 1041A CA 2001
refers to transactions that have the effect of creating an artificial price or
maintaining it at a level that is artificial, while Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003
prohibits transactions which bring or secure the price at an artificial level.
Obviously, these prohibitions distinguish between traders creating nonartificial prices and traders creating artificial prices. The first group of
traders acts legitimately, while the second group acts illegitimately. The
problem remains that these prohibitions lack a precise delineation of
“non-artificial price” versus “artificial price.” As a result, a regulator is
free to use the prohibitions to counteract various transactions, such as all
transactions raising or depressing the price, uninformed transactions
raising or depressing the price, transactions having the purpose of
raising or depressing the price, or transactions moving the price away
from the fundamental value.
Thus, chances are that the regulator falsely employs Section 1041A
CA 2001 or Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003 in situations of supported price
pressure or erroneously ignores the prohibition in situations of
68
See Norman S. Poser, Stock Market Manipulation and Corporate Control Transactions, 40
U. MIAMI L. REV. 671, 731 (1986) (stating that a trader might manipulate even though he is
not interested in affecting stock prices as an end in itself) (emphasis added); see also James H.
Mathias, Manipulative Practice and The Securities Exchange Act, 3 U. PITT. L. REV. 7 (1936)
(explaining that manipulation is “a planned effort to affect the market price of a security by
artificial means”) (emphasis added).
69
See James W. Moore & Frank M. Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2
U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 50 (1934) (“Manipulation leads to an artificial and controlled price.”)
(emphasis added).
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unsupported price pressure. Both mistakes will most likely result in
societal costs. If the regulator uses the prohibition in situations of
supported price pressure, he falsely qualifies a legitimate trader as a
manipulator, and when he ignores the prohibition in situations of
unsupported price pressure, he erroneously indemnifies a manipulator.
A regulator would reduce these risks by interpreting the prohibitions in
line with the “unsupported price pressure” standard, so that the
distinction between non-artificial prices and artificial prices is welldefined. The reasoning is as follows: in the event that a trader exercises
supported price pressure, he creates a non-artificial price and is a
legitimate trader. On the other hand, when the trader exercises
unsupported price pressure, he creates an artificial price and might
qualify as a manipulator.
B. The Materiality Standard
Section IV.A explains how legislators have to design a new
prohibition on manipulation and how regulators could interpret current
prohibitions. The following analysis concentrates on the extent of the
unsupported price pressure. Prohibitions on manipulation may benefit
from a materiality standard, just like the prohibition on informationbased manipulation and insider trading does.
1.

The Basics of the Materiality Standard

Economic and legal scholars often consider manipulation to be
binary. Traders are either informed or uninformed.70 If the trader is
informed and influences the stock price, he is no manipulator. On the
other hand, if the trader is uninformed and influences the stock price, he
might qualify as a manipulator. This binary approach shows little
similarities with real-life situations.
Both informed traders and
uninformed traders are able to exercise unsupported price pressure.
70
Aggarwal & Wu, supra note 2, at 1937 (“[A] key to successful manipulation is the
pooling of the manipulator with the truthful informed party. Hence, the manipulator
needs either to be informed or to be able to credibly pose as being informed.”); see also
HARRIS, supra note 7, at 266 (“Bluffers behave as though they are informed speculators, and
they hope that others will believe they are well-informed speculators, but they do not have
well-founded opinions about values.”); Yadlin, supra note 3, at 842 (“. . . I distinguish
between informed and uninformed manipulators. Both types of manipulators trade for the
purpose of affecting the market price. But informed manipulators are privy to private
information that leads them to believe that the market has mispriced the stock and that
their effect on the market will better reflect that stock’s value.”); Mahoney, supra note 8, at
354-55 (“An easily tested alternative to the manipulation hypothesis is that the pools were
informed.”).
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Accordingly, the regulator cannot rely solely on the suspect’s
information position. He should always determine both the exercised
price pressure and the justified price pressure before drawing any
conclusions. Having determined both exercised price pressure and
justified price pressure, he is able to calculate the extent of the
unsupported price pressure. This step-by-step plan has been described
in Section III.A.
Consider the following examples: if a trader exercises a price
pressure of +$5, while in possession of information pointing at future
supported price pressure of +$4.5, the unsupported price pressure is
+$0.5; on the other hand, if the exercised price pressure is +$5 and the
trader is in possession of information pointing at future supported price
pressure of +$0.5, the unsupported price pressure is +$4.5. Clearly, the
extent of the unsupported price pressure and, possibly, the size of the
societal costs, vary significantly. It would be impractical and unwise to
maintain a prohibition on manipulation that covers any situation of
unsupported price pressure. There is no need to prohibit minor forms of
unsupported price pressure, as the price influence and societal costs are
negligible. Besides, traders may become reluctant to execute welfareenhancing trades. This might have a negative impact on market
operations.
In order to mitigate the negative consequences of an excessively
strict regime, a materiality standard with respect to the extent of the
unsupported price pressure is desirable. This should not be a formal and
codified materiality standard as in most prohibitions on informationbased manipulation and insider trading, but an informal and voluntary
materiality standard to which the regulator could adhere. A formal
materiality standard would result in a high burden of proof. The
regulator should take into account the materiality of the unsupported
price pressure in case he has a reliable estimate. A materiality standard
would not only encourage traders to trade competitively, but also create
systematic consistency. The U.S. and E.U. prohibitions on trade-based
market manipulation currently do not have an explicit materiality
standard, while the U.S. and E.U. prohibitions on information-based
manipulation and on insider trading do.71

71
The materiality standard would allow market participants to exercise little
unsupported price pressure, even when they expect a profit. The reason is straightforward:
companies and other market participants would otherwise become reluctant to execute
transactions that result in little unsupported price pressure, while the costs of these trades
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The application of a materiality standard, with an eye on the new
definitions herein, would be as follows: the regulator first determines the
extent of the exercised and justified price pressure, e.g. +$3 and +$2,
before calculating the extent of the unsupported price pressure, that is,
+$1; the regulator then decides what the minimal level of unsupported
price pressure ought to be, for example, +$2. This normative judgment is
usually based on a comparative assessment between the institutional
interests and investor protection. If the regulator or judge strives for
paternalistic securities regulation, he sets the minimal level very low.
Conversely, if the regulator believes in liberal securities regulation, the
minimal level is high. A market participant risks a violation of the
prohibition on manipulation if the extent of the unsupported price
pressure exceeds the minimal level. In the foregoing example, the
unsupported price pressure of +$1 is irrelevant, considering the minimal
level of +$2.
2.

The Correction of the Materiality Standard

So far, for expositional clarity, the discussion has been limited to the
materiality of the unsupported price pressure, ignoring the materiality of
the unsupported profit.
Immaterial unsupported price pressure,
however, sometimes results in a large unsupported profit. A regulator,
who adheres to the described materiality standard, does not take
measures against immaterial unsupported price pressure, even when
this goes together with a large unsupported profit. Such decision is
undesirable, as the societal costs may be large. A regulator should look
at both the extent of the unsupported price pressure and the size of the
unsupported profit. In the end, it is not only the extent of the
unsupported price pressure but also the size of the unsupported profit
that is a good indicator of the societal costs. Therefore, the regulator
should fine immaterial unsupported price pressure as long as it results in
a large unsupported profit.
The regulator should investigate whether the unsupported price
pressure was material. If this is not the case, he should assess whether
any unsupported profit was material. However, should the regulator
estimate the expected profit72 or the realized profit?73 There are a few
are negligible. Likewise, companies are allowed to spread untrue or misleading
information as long as it has a small impact, while management can legitimately use inside
information as long as it is immaterial.
72
Economic models of manipulation fulfill the rational actor assumption by using
expected profit. See, e.g., Gastineau & Jarrow, supra note 3, at 41 (“[T]he trader undertakes
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practical arguments to focus on expected profit. Firstly, the proof of an
expected profit is less complicated than the proof of a realized profit.
Indeed, the regulator only has to prove that a trader exercised
unsupported price pressure, while he could expect to profit from his
action in the near future. Secondly, the prohibition would apply to both
traders who attempt to manipulate the market and traders who are
actually successful. Accordingly, this approach prevents a complex
distinction between failing and successful manipulators. It is wise to
perform just a marginal investigation with respect to the extent of the
unsupported profit.
As already stated, an informal materiality standard with respect to
the extent of the unsupported price pressure is desirable. Likewise, an
informal materiality standard as to the unsupported profit could be
beneficial. Consider the following example, in which both materiality
standards are explained. Imagine a trader who buys 1,000 shares of ABC
and exercises price pressure of +$0.5, so that the price of ABC shares
rises from $20 to $20.5 per share. Assume that the trader has an
informational privilege, knowing that the price should be $20.3. This
means that the trader has exercised supported price pressure of +$0.3
and unsupported price pressure of +$0.2. If the regulator adheres to the
materiality standard and qualifies the unsupported price pressure of
+$0.2 as irrelevant, he cannot apply the prohibition and fine the
behavior, except when the unsupported profit and the societal costs are
large.
The regulator will have to assess the unsupported profit. Having
exercised price pressure of +$0.5, the trader sells one million shares of
ABC in a contractual person-to-person deal, while the price of this deal is
derived from the price on the exchange. By exercising price pressure of
+$0.5, the trader makes a total profit of $500,000. Assuming that the
costs of exercising unsupported price pressure are small and that
corrective traders were absent, one can calculate that the supported
profit was as large as $300,000 and the unsupported profit $200,000. If
the regulator has the ability to discover the extent of the unsupported
profit, he then has to set a minimal level, depending on his ideas about
the level of investor protection. He has a reason to fine the unsupported
it anyway, expecting to profit from advantages related to size and intertemporal differences
in market impact.”) (emphasis added).
73
Cf. Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 510 (“Manipulative trades could be defined as
profitable trades . . . the resulting profit comes solely from the trader’s ability to move prices
and not from his possession of valuable information.”) (emphasis added).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 4 [2008], Art. 4

1206 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

price pressure if the unsupported profit, which is $200,000, is larger than
the minimal size of the unsupported profit, e.g., when the minimum level
is $50,000.
C. Mens Rea Elements
Having reduced the definition of manipulation to “exercising
unsupported price pressure,” there is a smaller role for the mens rea than
many authors claim. Indeed, if a regulator would adopt the proposed
standard, traders are protected as long as they execute supported price
pressure. Nonetheless, the legislator is free to take up a mens rea
element. By doing so, the legislator would protect traders who are not
culpable of exercising unsupported price pressure.
1.

The Relevance of the Mens Rea

Normally, a legislator develops a prohibition in a natural sequence.
He might want to prohibit certain behavior because of the supposed
societal costs. After a legislator has decided to do so, he could include a
mens rea element, emphasizing culpability. Many legal systems prefer
prohibitions that include a mens rea element. According to general
consensus, one should keep punishment abreast of culpability.
However, legal systems generally do not require this proportionality,
especially when it comes to economic crimes. They allow for a “strict”
liability regime, which does not take into account culpability.74
Legislators regularly design prohibitions that cover harmful economic
activities without any reference to the mens rea. The idea is that these
activities have a large impact and as such should be prohibited,
irrespective of the culpability of the defendant. Yet, even under such a
strict liability-regime, offenders usually have the opportunity to make a
claim to various mens rea defenses.
Since this Article shows that the legislator is able to objectively define
manipulation, while legal systems allow legislators to design
See, e.g., (for the U.S.) SANFORD H. KADISH AND STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 235-37 (2001) (“While the general rule at common law was that
scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime . . . there has
been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of
which would be obstructed by such a requirement.”); (and for the E.U.) Saliabaku v. France,
14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988) (“In particular, and again in principle, the Contracting States may,
under certain conditions, penalise a simple or objective fact as such, irrespective of whether
it results from criminal intent or from negligence. Examples of such offences may be found
in the laws of the Contracting States.”).
74
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prohibitions according to “strict liability,” it is remarkable that scholars
often automatically link manipulation with a mens rea element.75 Some
scholars even claim that one can only delineate manipulation by
evaluating the state of mind.76 For example, Fischel and Ross have
argued that “there is no objective definition of manipulation.”
According to them, “[t]he only definition that makes any sense is
subjective.” Fischel and Ross put forward a couple of arguments to
underpin these statements. They, however, stress in fact the importance
of a well-defined objective side of manipulation rather than the
importance of the mens rea. Indeed, the suggested “unsupported price
pressure” standard would remove most of the advanced problems, even
without reference to the mens rea.77
75
See, e.g., Yadlin, supra note 3, at 840 (“. . . I define stock manipulation as the buying (or
selling) of a security for the purpose of increasing (or depressing) its market price.”); see
also Thel, supra note 7, at 221 n.17 (“[T]he word ‘manipulation’ means buying a security for
the purpose of increasing the reported price or selling a security for the purpose of
decreasing the reported price.”); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 393 (1990) (“[M]anipulation means anything in
particular, it means conduct intended to induce people to trade a security or force its price
to an artificial level”); Mathias, supra note 68, at 7 (“Manipulation, which may be defined as
a planned effort to affect the market price of a security by artificial means, has been a
troublesome problem for centuries.”).
76
See, e.g., Ferrarini, supra note 3, at 724 (“The Directive does not include any reference
to intent, which is often considered as an essential element of manipulation. . . . [I]t is
doubtful that manipulation can be adequately defined by omitting any reference to
intent.”); Jesper L. Hansen, The New Proposal for a European Union Directive on Market Abuse,
23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 241, 267 (2002) (“Some of these examples are acceptable, such as
wash sales. Others bristle with difficulties, such as trading specifically to interfere with the
spot or the settlement price of derivative contracts. Here, an evaluation of the person’s
state of mind seems necessary.”); GOLDWASSER, supra note 3, at 109 (“The line between
legitimate and manipulative trading is a very thin one. The distinction depends upon
proof of the requisite intent on the part of the defendant.”); Vauplane & Simart, supra note
1, at 229 (referring to the heading, “Paramount Importance of the Intent Element”); Poser,
supra note 68, at 729 (“Where a person is accused of manipulating a stock through trading,
his activities . . . are in themselves consistent with the perfectly innocuous . . . purpose of
making a profit. This is in contrast with other manipulative techniques, such as false
statements, bribery, or fictitious transactions, which, being deceptive or at least wrongful in
themselves, require a less specific intent to make them manipulative.”).
77
Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 509-10. Their first argument is that “traders with
private information who disguise their trades with the effect that prices do not move in the
correct direction, or even move in the wrong direction, also trade with ‘good’ intent and
thus are not engaged in manipulation because their ultimate profit is attributable to the
private information they possess.” Id. at 510. This group of traders, however, does not
need the protection of “good intent,” since traders who protect their information will not
cause any price pressure. And if they do cause price pressure, it will most likely be
supported. Fischel and Ross further raise the question, “what happens if the trades move
prices in one direction because the trader genuinely believes that prices will move in this
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This does not mean that a prohibition on manipulation should be
completely objective. Rather, a prohibition should emphasize the
objective side of manipulation without overstressing the mens rea. If a
legislator designs a prohibition in line with the “unsupported price
pressure” standard, the introduction of a mens rea element is, at most,
optional.
The description of costly behavior, namely exercising
unsupported price pressure, is disconnected from the culpability.
Conversely, if a legislator has designed a prohibition that is too broad, in
the sense that it covers more situations than “exercising unsupported
price pressure,” a legislator could better rethink the objective side, than
recover the definition with a mens rea element. Rethinking the objective
side secures the quality and transparency of jurisdiction, while
continuing a broad prohibition replaces the individual assessment of the
“unsupported price pressure” and the “culpability” with a single
assessment of the mens rea, resulting in a mingling of different elements.
2.

The Implementation of the Mens Rea

Should the suggested prohibition on manipulation, which is
completely objective, incorporate a mens rea element to include
culpability? Some people will claim that an adequate prohibition merely
applies to traders who are culpable of exercising unsupported price
pressure. Other people will argue that a prohibition with a mens rea
element raises the burden of proof in an unjustifiable way. Taking a
stance in this legal doctrinal debate is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, if a legislator prefers a prohibition with a mens rea element,
he will have to think about the design of this element. Most discussions
on the prohibition on manipulation ignore this question. A legislator
could grosso modo design the mens rea element in line with the mens rea
elements in the prohibition on information-based manipulation and the
prohibition on insider trading.
The U.S. and E.U. regimes against information-based manipulation
prescribe that the person was at least “reckless.” Basically, under Rule
10b-5, the regulator has to prove that the person was reckless in regard
direction, but the trader turns out to be wrong and prices ultimately move in the opposite
direction?” Id. at 509. Their answer is that, “[t]rading based on a genuine belief that prices
will ultimately move in the direction of the trades is the essence of nonmanipulative
trading.” But the standard of unsupported price pressure is sufficient in this case. A trader
with a weak belief is allowed to exercise little price pressure. In addition, a trader with
significant information can exercise large price pressure. If traders follow this rule of
thumb, they will exercise supported price pressure.
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to the information deficiency.78
Likewise, under the European
prohibition on information-based manipulation, the regulator should
prove that the person knew or was reckless in not knowing about the
information deficiency.79 Furthermore, the U.S. and E.U. regimes against
insider trading require that there is some type of “knowledge” with
respect to the inside information. Despite the fact that case law under
Rule 10b-5 is ambiguous, prescribing either the “knowing possession
of”80 or “the use of inside information,”81 the regulator has to prove some
type of “knowledge.” The same applies to the European prohibition on
insider trading, which is applicable to the “use of”82 inside information.
So, a legislator has at least two models to design the mens rea element
in the prohibition on trade-based market manipulation. The first model
connects liability to “recklessness in not knowing that one exercises
unsupported price pressure” and the second model to “knowing that
one exercises unsupported price pressure.” The first model is preferable
from a practical point of view. Lowering the minimum mental state to
“recklessness in not knowing” makes the proof of manipulation less
complicated. Further, trade-based market manipulation relates more to
information-based manipulation, which uses the “recklessness in not
knowing” element, than to insider trading. Consequently, the trader
would be allowed to underestimate the extent of his price pressure,
overestimate his information position, and/or miscalculate the justified
price pressure, as long as he is not reckless in not knowing that he does
so. I endorse the view that this approach results in a complex
assessment. At the same time, it makes the adjudication adequate and
transparent.
78
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (deciding that negligence is
not actionable under Rule 10b-5); see also Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d
1033, 1044 (7th Cir. 1977) (deciding that a reckless omission of material facts are actionable
under Rule 10b-5). Criminal proceedings require willful violations of the Act, according to
Section 32(a) SEA 1934.
79
European Parliament Directive 2003/6/EC of Jan. 2003, § 1(2)(a). According to
Section 1(2)(c) MAD 2003, it is prohibited to disseminate false or misleading information
“where the person who made the dissemination knew, or ought to have known, that the
information was false or misleading.” Id.
80
See, e.g., United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993) (arguing that the
“knowing possession of inside information” is sufficient).
81
See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998) (deciding that the
“use of inside information” should be required in criminal cases).
82
European Parliament Directive 2003/6/EC of Jan. 2003, § 2(1)(a). Section 2(1)(a) of
MAD states: “Member States shall prohibit any person . . . who possesses inside
information from using that information by acquiring or disposing of . . . financial
instruments . . . .” Id.
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V. APPLICATION AND EXTENSION
A. Application
The application of the prohibition on manipulation has been
troublesome since its introduction. Regulators find it hard to prove that
suspects have manipulated the market. The “unsupported price
pressure” standard will not bring relief and asks for an assessment of the
justified price pressure. Yet, a regulator has two methods to prove the
exercise of unsupported price pressure: direct proof and alternative
proof.
1.

Direct Proof of Unsupported Price Pressure

The preferred way to prove unsupported price pressure is by
arguing that the exercised price pressure was larger than the justified
price pressure, formal proof, or to present incriminating records and
statements, record proof. The formal method limits the probability of
Type I errors. However, it is hard to discover the information position of
the suspect at the moment of trading, so that the approximation of the
justified price pressure is questionable. Further, the regulator, of course,
welcomes records and statements that incriminate the suspect, but in
most suspicious situations there simply are none. I do not consider this
as a weakness of the analysis. It shows why proof of unsupported price
pressure is hard to produce. The following paragraphs examine the idea
and application of formal proof and record proof, notwithstanding that
only a small percentage of the cases allows for these types of proof.
Sections II and III explain how a regulator could uncover formal
evidence of unsupported price pressure. I will shortly recapitulate the
step-by-step process here. Sections II.B.1 and Section II.B.2 explain how
the regulator should first investigate the extent of the exercised price
pressure by approximating and polishing this value. He will then have
to discover the information position of the suspect at the moment of
trading. Thereupon, the information ought to be translated into the
justified price pressure. If the regulator has determined both the
exercised price pressure and justified price pressure, he has all the
information to decide on the quality of the exercised price pressure. It is
recommendable that a regulator, who decides that the suspect has
exercised unsupported price pressure, investigates if either the
unsupported price pressure is material or, in case the suspect has
benefited, the unsupported profit is material.
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A regulator will now and then have recordings of suspicious
conversations, which may be sufficient to prove the exercise of
unsupported price pressure. One can think of the following recording:
“I prefer a stock price of $12 instead of $10. Could you buy a large
amount of shares and inflate the stock price? I will compensate you for
all costs. The regulator will qualify this as manipulation, but I really
need a high price at the moment.” It would be a clear-cut case of
unsupported price pressure, if the conversation partner actually buys a
large amount of shares and inflates the stock price. The regulator could
argue that the suspect probably exercised unsupported price pressure as
large as +$2 and can then make a judgment about the materiality. Yet,
the proof will be more troublesome when the recording is vague, leaving
room for a scenario in which the suspect exercised supported price
pressure.
2.

Alternative Proof of Unsupported Price Pressure

In most situations, the regulator will probably not be able to provide
formal proof of manipulation, nor collect incriminating records.
Alternatively, he will most likely focus on two specific situations. First,
imagine a trader exercising extreme price pressure, for example +$5,
which he can hardly justify with an information set. Second, consider a
trader who executes exceptional trades and price pressure right before he
is in a position to make a profit that is dependent on the price pressure.
Both situations provide indications that the trader has exercised
unsupported price pressure.
Further, there might be sufficient
indications of the extent of the unsupported price pressure. This Section
discusses these situations and how to deal with the proof of unsupported
price pressure and the materiality.
In principle, a trader does not want to exercise price pressure, let
alone extreme price pressure, as he would trade at subordinate prices
and make a loss. Nevertheless, there are examples of traders making
mistakes when communicating orders to broker-dealers and examples of
broker-dealers making mistakes when entering the order, resulting in
extreme price pressure. Consider a trader exercising price pressure of
+$5, so that the stock price rises by ten percent. Under these
circumstances, a regulator is able to bear the evidence, since it is unlikely
that the suspect can justify the price pressure with a sufficiently large
information set. Of course, the suspect may provide proof to the
contrary. In the absence of any rebuttal, the regulator is able to conclude
that the extreme price pressure of +$5 is completely unsupported and
that such unsupported price pressure is material.
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Otherwise, the regulator might bear the evidence when the suspect
cumulatively: (1) shows exceptional trading behavior, that is, his trading
behavior deviates from his regular trading behavior;83 (2) exercises
exceptional price pressure, that is, he exercises more price pressure than
he normally exercises;84 and (3) is able to make a profit, which is
dependent on the exceptional price pressure.85 Consider the situation in
which the trader shows exceptional trading behavior by buying a large
amount of ABC shares on the exchange and exercising upward price
pressure of +$1, right before he sells an even larger amount of ABC
shares in a contractual person-to-person deal at a price derived from the
price on the exchange. When there is sufficient evidence that the price
pressure of +$1 was completely unsupported, the question remains
whether +$1 is considered to be material unsupported price pressure. If
the regulator decides that such unsupported price pressure is in fact
immaterial, he could investigate whether the suspect realized a material
unsupported profit. This appraisal is contextual.86
B. Extension
Other prohibitions and parts of prohibitions might benefit from the
“unsupported price pressure” standard as well. The prohibitions on
83
The trading behavior may be qualified as exceptional when: (1) the number and the
size of transactions deviates; (2) the interval between transactions is smaller; (3) the timing
and the pattern of the transactions is different; (4) the type of instrument is conspicuous;
and/or (5) the trader uses market-orders instead of limit-orders.
84
The price pressure is exceptional when a trader, who normally does not exercise any
price pressure or minor price pressure, suddenly exercises large price pressure. This is
suspicious when the trader exercises this price pressure shortly before he can make a profit
that is dependent on this price pressure.
85
The price pressure may go together with an expected profit, for example, when the
trader first exercises upward price pressure on the exchange and then sells a large amount
of derivatives in another market on the exchange. Furthermore, exercising price pressure
on the exchange in the shadow of contracts, offerings, and takeovers might be profitable
due to static prices of the exchange.
86
It should be noted that the regulator, under the given circumstances, cannot
automatically conclude that a trader exercised unsupported price pressure. There is
always a chance that the exercised price pressure was completely supported or
immaterially unsupported.
Therefore, the regulator should look for additional
circumstantial evidence that supports the hypothesis of unsupported price pressure.
Besides, he should carefully analyze facts and circumstances which throw doubt upon the
hypothesis of unsupported price pressure. Also, the regulator cannot conclude that the
trader exercised unsupported price pressure if there is a large interval between the moment
of exercising price pressure and the moment of benefiting from the price pressure. A
trader would probably not exercise unsupported price pressure if he cannot benefit from it
right away. The trader would give corrective traders the chance to remove the market
inefficiency, thereby losing his opportunity to make an unsupported profit.
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manipulation in the United States, European Union, and Australia are
not only applicable to traders who raise or depress the stock price, but
also to traders who create apparent active trading and induce other
traders to follow suit. The prohibitions are vague in this respect.
Besides, the prohibition of corners and squeezes has proven to be
problematic.
The main question is how to distinguish between
legitimate and manipulative corners and squeezes. This Section will
examine if and how legislators might overcome these shortcomings with
the proposed standard.
1.

Unsupported Market Information

As yet, the analysis has ignored the situation in which a trader
executes transactions at t, not exercising any direct price pressure at t+1,
but spreading market information at t+2, so that the market might create
indirect price pressure at t+3. Normally, an informed trader values his
information position highly and tries to protect it. As long as an
informed trader can protect his information privilege, he will be able to
make a profit by trading financial instruments. In order to protect his
information from other market participants, he will act discreetly and
limit the obtrusiveness of his transactions. Nevertheless, he will have to
act before the information becomes public by disclosure or research. As
the informed trader starts trading more aggressively, he will spread
more market information and break off his information privilege. Other
market participants pick up this information and use it for their trading
decisions.87
In principle, an uninformed trader does not spread valuable market
information and will be ignored by the rest of the market. Nonetheless,
if an uninformed manipulator mimics the behavior of an informed
trader, he can voluntarily spread false or misleading market information,
which market participants believe to be true, possibly causing indirect
unsupported price pressure. He could, for example, increase the number
and/or the size of his transactions, while trading at times when
informed traders trade. By changing the characteristics of the trades, the
uninformed trader falsely signals that he is informed.
Market
participants might believe these signals: Why else would he take a
chance to attract traders and trade at subordinate prices? This way an
uninformed trader might motivate traders to jump on the bandwagon,
87
See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 31, at 572-79. Gilson and Kraakman have
described this refined mechanism of derivatively informed trading through trade decoding
and price decoding. Id.
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causing indirect unsupported price pressure. Such an uninformed trader
in fact spreads false or misleading information about the value of
financial instruments.
Legislators sometimes qualify trading at t as manipulative when it
creates no direct price pressure at t+1, but produces false or misleading
market information at t+2 (irrespective of the potential indirect price
pressure at t+3). Three prohibitions in particular apply to this situation,
these being Section 9(a) of the SEA, Section 1(2)(a) MAD and Section
1041B CA. Section 9(a) of the SEA formulates it as “creating actual or
apparent active trading in” a security “for the purpose of inducing the
purchase or sale of such security by others.” Next, Section 1(2)(a) MAD
2003/6/EC applies to “transactions . . . which give, or are likely to give,
false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for or price of
financial instruments.” Likewise, Section 1041B CA prohibits, for
example, an act that “is likely to have the effect of creating, or causing
the creation of, a false or misleading appearance . . . of active trading.”
These prohibitions are not completely clear at face value and deserve
an adequate interpretation. First, Section 9(a) of the SEA vaguely defines
the objective side. What do parts like “actual or apparent active trading”
and “inducing the purchase or sale” mean? It further relies heavily on
the mens rea, by using the constituent element “for the purpose of
inducing.” The European and Australian definitions are objective, but
again, without an explicit delineation. The European prohibition points
at creating “false or misleading signals,” while the Australian
prohibition describes it as “a false or misleading appearance . . . of active
trading.” The problem with these two descriptions is the lack of an
explicit standard. When is the signal or the appearance false or
misleading? The “unsupported price pressure” standard cannot be used
to interpret the prohibitions, since there is no direct price pressure, only
market information.
The solution is converting the “unsupported price pressure”
standard into an “unsupported market information” standard,
distinguishing between high- and low-quality market information. The
trading results in supported market information if the trader possesses
sufficient information. Otherwise, the trading results in unsupported
market information. The prohibitions in effect can be replaced with, or
interpreted in line with, the “unsupported market information”
standard. Section 9(a) of the SEA could be interpreted as executing
transactions that result in unsupported market information for the purpose of
inducing the purchase or sale of a security by others, Section 1(2)(a) MAD
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2003/6/EC as executing transactions that result in unsupported market
information as to the supply of, demand for, or price of financial instruments,
and Section 1041B CA as an act that results in unsupported market
information.
Thus, a trader manipulates the market when he trades and spreads
unsupported market information. A regulator will have to approximate
the extent of the dispersed market information and the extent of the
underlying information before he can draw any conclusions about the
quality of the market information. If the dispersed market information is
larger than the underlying information, the market information was false
or misleading. It is not hard to imagine that a regulator will have
problems applying the “unsupported market information” standard in
practice—they will rarely be able to furnish proof. This shortcoming,
however, relates more to the complexity of regulating manipulation,
than to quality of the “unsupported market information” standard.
There is, however, an exception. Fictitious transactions, like wash sales
and matched orders, will spread false or misleading information by
definition.
2.

Corners and Squeezes

A futures contract calls for delivery of a commodity, whereby the
maturity date and agreed-upon price are specified. A futures contract
involves two contracting parties. The trader taking the long position
commits to purchasing the commodity at the maturity date, while the
trader taking the short position commits to delivering the commodity on
that date. A futures contract is a zero-sum game: The trader who takes
the long position has a profit that equals the spot price at maturity minus
the agreed-upon price, while the trader who takes the short position has
a profit that equals the agreed-upon price minus the spot price at
maturity.88 The trader who takes the long position profits and the trader
who takes the short position loses when the spot price rises, just as the
long loses and the short profits when the spot price drops. Hedgers and
speculators use futures markets for different reasons. Hedgers use
futures contracts to reduce the risk of variable spot prices. By contrast,
speculators use futures contracts to anticipate variable futures prices.89
Futures contracts provide opportunities for manipulation. A trader
creates market power by buying a large part of the deliverable supply of
88
89

See, e.g., ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 740-41 (2002).
Id. at 750.
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the commodity, referred to as a corner, and/or taking a large long
position, referred to as a squeeze, thereby forcing the shorts to deliver
the commodity at the expiration day. Since the shorts are only able to
acquire the commodity at increasing marginal costs due to scarcity in the
delivery market, and due to transportation costs as regards to other
markets, the spot price and futures price rise. The manipulator profits
from his market power, because the shorts have to settle at an inflated
price. The manipulator buys, for example, a large amount of wheat and
takes a large long position, thereby creating market power. Next, he
limits the supply of the wheat and requires a large amount of deliveries,
thereby inflating the spot price from $20 to $25. Shorts must either
purchase commodities at an extra $5 or negotiate a cash settlement
between $0 and $5, which equals the profit of the manipulator.
Generally, the problem is how to distinguish between normal and
manipulative market power. The analysis focuses on defining the
distinction instead of tracing potential forms of manipulative market
power. As the Introduction explains, after defining the concept of
behavior, other points of controversy can be more readily discussed.
Considering prior articles on corners and squeezes, authors regularly use
two models to distinguish between normal and manipulative market
power. The first model distinguishes between normal and artificial
demand, or normal and artificial prices.90 Normal demand results in a
normal price and artificial demand in an artificial price. The second
model discriminates between intent to create normal prices and intent to
create artificial prices, or between intent to trade legitimately and intent
to corner or squeeze the market.91 Basically, both models require a

90
See Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical Analysis and a
Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 960 (1994). Pirrong argues that “price
artificiality is the sine qua non of manipulation.” Id. Also, Jerry W. Markham argues that a
manipulator “is buying so many futures contracts and such large quantities of the
underlying commodity that its market power is sufficient to create and sustain a
manipulated or artificial price.” Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures
Prices—The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281, 283 (1991).
91
Fischel and Ross conclude that definition is impossible without assessment of intent.
Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 547 (“[W]e are left with no objective definition of
manipulation in futures markets.”). Richard D. Friedman states that, “[a]lthough intent is
an essential element of a squeeze under the classical approach, it is the intent to create an
artificial price.” Richard D. Friedman, Stalking the Squeeze: Understanding Commodities
Market Manipulation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 30, 58 (1990).
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precise definition of normal and artificial demand or prices, which the
literature has not yet provided.92
What are the conditions to qualify demand or prices as normal or
artificial? According to the “unsupported price pressure” standard, the
regulator should compare the exercised price pressure with the justified
price pressure. A trader exercises supported price pressure and creates a
normal futures price when the exercised price pressure is equal to or less
than the justifiable price pressure. Logically, the trader exercises
unsupported price pressure and creates an artificial futures price when
the exercised price pressure is larger than the justified price pressure.
The method to determine the extent of the exercised price pressure is
explained in Section II.B, and the method to derive the justifiable price
pressure in Section III.A.2. The justifiable price pressure should be
derived from the information position of the trader.
The term
“information” includes all information that: (1) points at an
undervaluation or overvaluation of a futures contract or (2) points at
coming supported price pressure with respect to a futures contract.
Thus, a trader manipulates the market when he exercises
unsupported price pressure in the futures market, which accompanies an
expected profit due to cornering the market and/or squeezing the shorts.
It is important to note that a trader who buys a large part of the
deliverable supply or takes a large long position, thereby exercising price
pressure in the futures market and making a profit by cornering the
market and/or squeezing the shorts, is not automatically a manipulator.
The trader might have sufficient information that he or other persons or
companies will demand large amounts of the commodity, for example
wheat, in the near future, so that the exercised price pressure is
supported. This means that a regulator will always have to assess the
information position and the potential demand of the suspect. It further
means that an objective definition of futures manipulation is sufficient.93
As Section IV.C.1 explains, legislators may include a mens rea element;
however, they are not obliged to do so.
See, e.g., Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 546 (arguing that the concept of price
artificiality brings no solution to distinguish between legitimate and manipulative market
power); Friedman, supra note 91, at 54-55 (criticizing some interpretations of the term
“artificial price”); Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 117-18 (arguing that real demand and
artificial demand are indistinguishable).
93
Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 117-18 (“No one accumulates futures contracts—for
reasons good or ill—unaware of what he is doing. Everyone in the futures market intends
to make as much money as he can. Scrutiny of intent therefore is not likely to assist in the
search for manipulation.”).
92
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VI. CONCLUSION
Trade-based market manipulation has received wide attention in
theoretical and policy discussions, even though the behavior is still
poorly defined in both economic and legal literature. This Article
contributes to an understanding of manipulation by providing a precise
definition of the concept, that being exercising unsupported price pressure.
The Article explains how legislators could design an adequate
prohibition on manipulation and how regulators might improve and
interpret contemporary prohibitions. It further provides insights in how
to enforce a prohibition on manipulation.
A regulator should focus on the extent of price pressure rather than
on the size of stock price changes. “Price pressure” is defined as the
contribution of a set of transactions to the total price change.
Consequently, it is possible to distinguish between the contribution of
the suspect and the contributions of other market participants to the
stock price change. If a regulator would not look at the contribution of
the suspect but at the stock price variance during the trading of the
suspect, the regulator most likely overestimates or underestimates the
contribution of the suspect to the stock price change.
Another recommendation is that a regulator ought to allow
supported price pressure and ban unsupported price pressure.
Supported price pressure has an adequate influence on the stock price,
while unsupported price pressure creates a market inefficiency. If a
trader’s price pressure is larger than the justifiable price pressure, he
produces unsupported price pressure. The exercised price pressure
minus the justified price pressure is the extent of the unsupported price
pressure. Otherwise, if a trader’s price pressure is equal to or less than
the justifiable price pressure, he produces supported price pressure.
An adequate prohibition on manipulation applies to all transactions
that result in unsupported price pressure, causing extra price volatility
and extra information asymmetries. A trader exercising unsupported
price pressure initiates welfare shifts between uninformed traders on the
one hand and corrective traders or himself on the other hand. Indeed, a
trader who exercises unsupported price pressure creates an
informational privilege, of which he may take advantage. In conclusion,
we can say that unsupported price pressure results in welfare shifts and
reduced liquidity, which has a negative impact on market operations.
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The Article has some policy implications. It shows that legislators
should design a prohibition on manipulation according to the
“unsupported price pressure” standard and interpret contemporary
prohibitions in line with this standard. Viewed in this context, one can
see why a regulator should take into account the materiality of the
unsupported price pressure if possible.
Further, contrary to
conventional wisdom, the prohibition should better stress the objective
side of manipulation than the mens rea. Finally, attention is paid to the
way the regulator has to prove the exercise of unsupported price
pressure.
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